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PREFACE
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 emphasizes the need for 
standards to protect the health and safety of workers exposed to an ever- 
increasing number of potential hazards in their workplace.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
evaluates all available research data and criteria and recommends standards 
for safe work practices and occupational exposure to toxic substances. The 
Secretary of Labor will weigh these recommendations along with other 
considerations, such as feasibility and means of implementation, in 
promulgating regulatory standards.
NIOSH will periodically review the recommended standards to ensure 
continuing protection of workers and will make successive reports as new 
research and epidemiologic studies are completed and as engineering controls 
for the workers safety are developed.
The contributions to this document on working in confined spaces by 
members of the NIOSH staff, other Federal agencies or departments, the review 
consultants, and Robert 6 . O'Connor, M.D., NIOSH consultant in occupational 
medicine, are gratefully acknowledged.
The views and conclusions expressed in this document, together with the 
recommendations for a standard, are those of NIOSH. They are not necessarily 
those of the consultants, the reviewers selected by professional and trade 
associations, or other Federal agencies. However, all comments, whether or 
not incorporated, were considered carefully and were sent with the criteria 
document to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration for 
consideration in setting the standard. The review consultants and the Federal 
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I. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A  STANDARD FOR
WORKING IN CONFINED SPACES
NIOSH recommends the procedures set forth in the following sections as a 
means of protecting the health, and significantly reducing accidental injury 
and death associated with entering, working in, and exiting from confined 
spaces. The standard is designed not only to make the confined space safe for 
the worker, but also to make the worker cognizant of the hazards associated 
with this work area and the safe work practices necessary to deal with these 
hazards. The criteria and standard will be reviewed and revised as necessary.





Confined Space, Class "A1
Confined Space, Class "B'
Confined Space, Class "C'
For Purposes of this Document
Refers to the gases, vapors, mists, fumes, 
and dusts within a confined space.
The maximum airborne concentration of a 
toxic agent to which an employee may be 
exposed for a specified period of time.
A dust capable of undergoing combustion or 
of burning when subjected to a source of 
ignition.
Refers to a space which by design has 
limited openings for entry and exit; 
unfavorable natural ventilation which could 
contain or produce dangerous air 
contaminants, and which is not intended for 
continuous employee occupancy. Confined 
spaces include but are not limited to 
storage tanks, compartments of ships, 
process vessels, pits, silos, vats, 
degreasers, reaction vessels, boilers, 
ventilation and exhaust ducts, sewers, 
tunnels, underground utility vaults, and 
pipelines.
A confined space that presents a situation 
that is immediately dangerous to life or 
health (IDLH). These include but are not 
limited to oxygen deficiency, explosive or 
flammable atmospheres, and/or concentrations 
of toxic substances.
A confined space that has the potential for 
causing injury and illness, if preventive 
measures are not used, but not immediately 
dangerous to life and health.
A confined space in which the potential 
hazard would not require any special 
modification of the work procedure.
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Any work involving burning, welding, 
riveting, or similar fire producing 
operations, as well as work which produces a 
source of ignition, such as drilling, 
abrasive blasting, and space heating.
Displacement of the atmosphere by a non­
reactive gas (such as nitrogen) to such an
extent that the resulting atmosphere is
noncombustible.
A process whereby the confined space is 
removed from service and completely 
protected against the inadvertent release of 
material by the following: blanking off
(skillet type metal blank between flanges), 
misaligning sections of all lines and pipes, 
a double block and bleed system, electrical 
lockout of all sources of power, and
blocking or disconnecting all mechanical 
linkages.
Lower Flammable Limit (LFL) The minimum concentration of a combustible
gas or vapor in air (usually expressed in 
percent by volume at sea level), which will 
ignite if an ignition source (sufficient 
ignition energy) is present.
Oxygen Deficiency Refers to an atmosphere with a partial
pressure of oxygen (P02) less than 132 mm
Hg. Normal air at sea level contains 
approximately 21% oxygen at a P 0 2 of 160 mm 
Hg. At an altitude of 5,280 feet normal air 
contains approximately 21% 0 2 at a P02 of
132 mm Hg.
Oxygen Enriched Atmosphere Any oxygen concentration greater than 25%
(P02 - 190 mm Hg) at normal atmospheric 
pressure.
Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) The maximum 8-hour time weighted average of
any airborne contaminant to which an 
employee may be exposed. At no time shall 
the exposure level exceed the ceiling 
concentration for that contaminant as listed 
in 29 CFR Part 1910 Sub Part Z.
Purging The method by which gases, vapors, or other
airborne impurities are displaced from a
confined space.
Qualified Person A person designated by the employer, in
writing, as capable (by education and/or 
specialized training) of anticipating, 





exposure to hazardous substances or other 
unsafe conditions in a confined space. This 
person shall be capable of specifying 
necessary control and/or protective action 
to insure worker safety.
Respirator (Approved) A device which has met the requirements of
30 CFR Fart 11 and is designed to protect 
the wearer from inhalation of harmful 
atmospheres and has been approved by the 
Bureau of Mines and the National Institute 
for Occupational Safety and Health, and Mine 
Safety and Health Administration (formerly, 
Mining Enforcement and Safety
Administration).
Standby Person A person trained in emergency rescue
procedures and assigned to remain on the 
outside of the confined space and to be in 
communication with those working inside.
Section 2 - Entry and Rescue
The Confined Space Classification Table on page 4 is based on existing or 
potential hazards relative to the confined space. The classification is based 
upon the characteristics of the confined space, oxygen level, flammability and 
toxicity. If any of the hazards present a situation which is immediately 
dangerous to life or health (IDLH) , the confined space shall be designated 
Class A. The classification shall be determined by the most hazardous 
condition of entering, working in, and exiting a confined space. Class B 
confined space has the potential for causing injury and illness but is not 
immediately dangerous to life and health. A Class C entry would be one in 
which the hazard potential would not require any special modification of the 
work procedure.
The Check List of Consideration on page 5 delineates the minimum 
preparation required for each class of confined space entry. In the 
recommended standard where specific procedures, activities or requirements are 
correlated with a classification: the procedure, activity or requirement is
mandatory. As an example, Section 3 - Permit System (Class A, B and C) means 
that a permit is mandatory for Class A, B, and C confined space entry.
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CONFINED SPACE CLASSIFICATION TABLE
Parameters Class A Class B Class C
Charac t erIs tles Immediately dangerous to 
life - rescue proced­
ures require the entry 
of more than one 
individual fully 
equipped with life 
support equipment - 
maintenance of com­
munication requires an 
additional standby 
person stationed 
within the confined 
space
dangerous, but not 
immediately life 
threatening - rescue 
procedures require the 
entry of no more than 
one individual fully 
equipped with life 
support equipment - 
indirect visual or 
auditory communication 
with workers
potential hazard - 
requires no modif­
ication of work 
procedures - standard 
rescue procedures - 
direct communication 
with workers, from 
outside the confined 
space
Oxygen 16% or less 
*(122 mm Hg) or 
greater than 25% 
*(190 mm Hg)
16.1% to 19.4% 
*(122 - 147 mm Hg) 
or 21.5% to 25% 
(163 - 190 mm Hg)
19.5% - 21.4% 
*(148 - 163 mm Hg)
Flammability
Characteristics
20% or greater of LFL 10% - 19% LFL 10% LFL or less
Toxicity **IDLH greater than contamina­
tion level, referenced 
in 29 CFR Part 1910 
Sub Part Z - less than 
**IDLH
less than contamination 
level referenced in 
29 CFR Part 1910 
Sub Part Z
*Based upon a total atmospheric pressure of 760 mm Hg (sea level)
**Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health - as referenced in NIOSH Registry of Toxic 
and Chemical Substances, Manufacturing Chemists data sheets, industrial 
hygiene guides or other recognized authorities.
CHECK LIST OP CONSIDERATIONS FOR ENTRY,
WORKING IN AND EXITING CONFINED SPACES
ITEM CLASS A CLASS B CLASS C
1. Permit X X X
2. Atmospheric Testing X X X
3. Monitoring X 0 0
4. Medical Surveillance X X 0
5. Training of Personnel X X X
6 . Labeling and Posting X X X
7. Preparation
Isolate/lockout/tag X X 0
Purge and ventilate X X 0
Cleaning Processes 0 0 0
Requirements for special X X 0
equipment/tools
8 . Procedures





9. Safety Equipment 
and Clothing
Head protection 0 0 0
Hearing protection 0 0 0
Hand protection 0 0 0
Foot protection 0 0 0
Body protection 0 0 0
Respiratory protection 0 0
Safety belts X X X
Life lines, harness X 0
10. Rescue Equipment X X X
11. Recordkeeping/Exposure X X
X - indicates requirement







If the work practice involved in the confined space has the potential to 
increase existing hazards' or generate additional ones, it shall be necessary 
to frequently evaluate the space to determine if a classification change is 
warranted.
Rescue procedures shall be specifically designed for each entry. If a 
confined space has an A or B Classification, there shall be a trained standby 
person assigned to that confined space with a fully charged, positive 
pressure, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) at hand. Additional 
duties of the standby person are to maintain unobstructed life lines and 
communications to all workers within the confined space, and to summon rescue 
personnel if necessary. Under no circumstances will the standby person enter 
the confined space until he is relieved and is assured that adequate 
assistance is present. However, while awaiting rescue personnel the standby 
person will make rescue attempts utilizing the life lines from outside the 
confined space. Rescue teams entering a Class A or B confined space shall be 
equipped with all the aforementioned safety equipment of the standby person 
and required life lines.
In the event of a Class C confined space rescue, a supplied-air respirator 
or a self-contained breathing apparatus shall be used. A person summoned or 
one who recognizes the need for rescue shall summon assistance and await their 
arrival outside the confined space. Respirators and life lines shall be 
donned by rescue personnel with necessary equipment for removal of the 
victim(s).
Section 3 - Permit System (Class A, B, and C)
Entry into a confined space shall be by permit only. The permit is an 
authorization and approval in writing that specifies the location and type of 
work to be done, and certifies that all existing hazards have been evaluated 
by the qualified person, and necessary protective measures have been taken to 
insure the safety of each worker.
The supervisor or a qualified person shall be responsible for securing the 
permit and both shall sign off when the following areas and actions have been 
reviewed and confirmed:
(a) Location and description of the work to be done.
(Class A, B, and C)
(b) Hazards that may be encountered.
(Class A, B, and C)
(c) Complete isolation checklist.
(Class A, B, and C)




(d) Special clothing and equipment.
(Class A and B)
(1) Personal protective equipment and clothing
(2) Safety harness and/or lines.
(3) Tools approved for use in accordance with the 
Hazardous Location Classification (NEC-1978).
(4) Approved electrical equipment.
(e) Atmospheric test readings.
(Class A, B, and C)
(1) Oxygen level.
(2) Flammability and/or explosive levels.
(3) Toxic substance levels.
(f) Atmospheric monitoring while work is being performed.
(Class A on a continuous basis and Class B as determined
by the Qualified Person)
(g) Personnel training and complete understanding of the hazards.
(Class A, B, and C)
(h) Standby person(s) as named on the permit.
(Class A and B)
(i) Emergency procedures and location of first aid equipment.
(Class A, B and C)
(j) Confined space classification A, B, and C.
This permit shall be dated and carry an expiration time that will be valid
for one shift only. The permit shall be updated for each shift with the same
requirements.
The permit for a Class A or B confined space shall be posted in a
conspicuous place, close to the entrance, with a copy on file with the 
employer.
The sample permit in Appendix III should serve as a guide and not be
limited to the areas mentioned. The training requirements of personnel
entering and/or working in confined spaces shall be suitable for the nature of 
the hazard and the work to be performed and will therefore vary with the
confined space classification. The permit will vary among different
industrial activities. However, it should serve the same purpose for all
industries, to insure the safety of the worker.
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Section 4 - Medical (Class A, B)
(a) Workers who enter a Class A or B confined space shall have a pre- 
placement physical examination made available to them. The employer shall 
provide to the physician performing or responsible for the medical 
surveillance program information such as the type of confined space the 
employee may be required to enter, the type of substances the employee may 
encounter, and a description of any protective devices or equipment the 
employee may be required to use. The physical examination shall include:
(1) A demonstration of the worker's ability to use negative and 
positive pressure respirators as cited in 29 CFR 1910.134.
(2) A demonstration of the workers ability to see and hear warnings, 
such as flashing lights, buzzers or sirens.
(3) The examination should place emphasis on general evaluations of 
the employee's ability to carry out his assigned duties and the detection of 
any diseases or abnormalities which may make it difficult to work within 
confined spaces.
(b) Following completion of the examinations, the physician shall give to 
the employer a written statement specifying any condition or abnormality found 
which would increase risk to the employee's health by working in confined 
spaces.
(c) Periodic medical examinations shall be made available to employees 
required to work in Class A or B confined spaces.
(d) First Aid Provisions
(1) For Class A and B entry there shall always be someone readily 
available in the area of the confined space who is currently trained in 
cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and basic first-aid procedures.
(2) Employees shall be aware of the location of the nearest first- 
aid equipment, and how to obtain emergency assistance and medical attention. 
An adequate supply of first-aid equipment shall be within easy access of the 
confined space.
(e) Records of exposure to known health hazards shall be included in that 
employee's medical record. These records shall be made available to the 
designated medical representatives of the Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare, of the Secretary of Labor, of the employer and of the employee or 
former employee.
Section 5 - Training (Class A, B, and C)
The employer shall be responsible for training personnel and for the 
safety of the entire operation. Personnel who work in the vicinity of 
confined spaces shall be made aware of the hazards associated with confined 
spaces during orientation. Personnel who are required to work in a confined 
space, or in support of those working in a confined space shall have 
additional training in the following areas:
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(a) Emergency entry and exit procedures (Class A, B, and C);
(b) Use of applicable respirators (Class A, B, and C);
(c) First aid (Class A, B);
(d) Lockout procedures (Class A, B, and C);
(e) Safety equipment use (Class A, B, and C);
(f) Rescue and training drills designed to maintain proficiency shall be
given initially to new employees, and thereafter, at least annually, or at 
lesser intervals as determined necessary by the judgment of the employer 
(Class A, B, and C);
(g) Permit system (Class A, B and C); and
(h) Work practices as recommended in Section 9 of this proposed standard.
(Class A, B and C)
Training shall not be considered as complete until the supervisor or other 
employer-designated official, safety or training officer, judges that the 
employee has attained an acceptable degree of proficiency for entering and 
working in confined spaces. The trainee's judgment of the adequacy of his 
training should be properly considered.
Section 6 - Testing and Monitoring (Class A, B, and C)
Entry into a confined space is prohibited until initial testing of the
atmosphere has been done from the outside . Appropriate tests shall be made 
to insure that the atmosphere is safe. The tests performed shall include 
those for oxygen content, flammability, and toxic materials. Any necessary 
additional tests will be selected and performed to the satisfaction of the 
qualified person. Monitoring of a Class A confined space shall be done on a
continuous basis. Class B and C shall be monitored as determined by the
qualified person.
Entry into a confined space for any type of hot work shall be prohibited 
when tests indicate the concentration of flammable gases in the atmosphere is 
greater than 10% of the lower flammability limit (LFL). It is necessary to 
determine the oxygen level (by appropriate testing) prior to measuring the 
range of flammability to make necessary corrections in the flammability 
measurement. Monitoring of the atmosphere shall be performed in accordance 
with the permit. Equipment for continuous monitoring of gases and vapors
shall be explosion proof and equipped with an audible alarm or danger 
signaling device that will alert employees when a hazardous condition 
develops. Instruments used for testing the atmosphere in a confined space 
shall be selected for their functional ability to measure hazardous 
concentrations. Instruments shall be calibrated in accordance with the 
manufacturer's guidelines or manuals. Each calibration shall be recorded, 
filed by the employer, and available for inspection for 1 year after the last 
calibration date.
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In any confined space classified as a Class II or Class III hazardous 
location according to the 1978 National Electrical Code, Article 500 Sections 
5 and 6 , a fire watch shall be established as part of the entry procedure. In 
such areas surface dust and fibers shall be removed and no hot work shall be
initiated until the airborne particulate level is below 10% of the LFL for the
material. When combustible dusts or ignitable fibers/flyings are present, all 
equipment and ventilation systems used in the confined space shall comply with 
Articles 502 and 503 of the National Electrical Code.
The percentage of oxygen for entry into a confined space shall be no less 
than 19.5% nor greater than 25% at 760 mm Hg. At sea level the normal 
atmospheric pressure for air (20.9% 02 + 78.1% N2 + 1% Ar + trace amounts of 
various inert gases) is 14.7 psi or 760 mm Hg absolute. The partial pressure 
of oxygen (PO2) at sea level will be approximately 160 mm Hg. PO2 can be
reduced by reducing the 0 2 level in air at a given elevation or through
increasing altitude. If tests indicate the oxygen level to be greater than 
25% hot work is prohibited until ventilating techniques have reduced the 
oxygen level to approximately 21%. If the percentage of oxygen falls below 
19.5% approved respiratory equipment shall be used in accordance with Section 
8 and Appendix II.
When the contaminants in the atmosphere cannot be kept within permissible 
exposure levels as set down in 29 CFR Part 1910 Sub Part Z, then the employee 
shall wear an approved respirator.
Section 7 - Labeling and Posting (Class A, B, and C)
(a) All warning signs shall be printed both in English and in the
predominant language of non-English reading workers. Where established
symbols exist, they shall also be used. Workers unable to read labels and
posted signs shall receive information regarding hazardous areas and shall be 
informed of the instructions printed on the signs.
(b) All entrances to any confined space shall be posted. Signs shall 
include but not necessarily be limited to the following information:
DANGER
CONFINED SPACE
ENTRY BY PERMIT 
ONLY
(c) When a specific work practice is performed or specific safety 
equipment is necessary, the following statement shall be added, in large 






HOT WORK PERMITTED 
OR
NO HOT WORK
(d) Emergency procedures, including phone numbers of fire departments and 
emergency medical services shall be posted conspicuously within the immediate 
area of the confined space, or at the telephone from which help would be 
summoned.
Section 8 - Safety Equipment and Clothing (Class A, B, and C)
The entry permit shall include a list of necessary protective equipment to 
be used in the confined space as determined by the qualified person. The 
employer shall be responsible for the proper use of the safety equipment, and 
the inspection and maintenance procedures performed on the safety equipment. 
The type of protective equipment required, will be determined by the qualified 
person.
Those items normally used to protect against traumatic injury include: 
safety glasses, hardhats, footwear and protective clothing.
(a) Eye and Face Protection - For persons who wear corrective spectacles, 
either prescription ground safety glasses or plano-goggles shall be provided. 
Additionally if eye-irritating chemicals, vapors, or dusts are present, safety 
goggles shall be required, and if both the face and eyes are exposed to a 
hazard, as during scrapping scale or cutting rivets, a full coverage face 
shield with goggles shall be used. During welding operations the special 
goggles or shields required shall be in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.252.
(b) Head Protection - Hard hats shall meet the requirements cited in 29 
CFR 1910.135.
(c) Foot Protection - All foot protection shall meet or exceed the 
requirements cited in 29 CFR 1910.136 and shall provide, in addition to 
protection from falling objects, protection from any other hazard identified 
by the qualified person.
(d) Body Protection - All personnel entering a confined space shall wear 
full coverage work clothing as specified by the qualified person. Gloves and 
clothing made of impervious rubber or similar material are to be worn to 
protect against toxic or irritating materials. If the hazards of heat or cold 
stress exist in the confined space, clothing which has been tested to provide 
protection from over-exposure to these hazards shall be worn. Other body 
protection required In specific operations such as welding (flame proofed) , 
riveting (heat resistant) and abrasive blasting (abrasion resistant) shall be 
provided to insure worker safety.
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(e) Hearing Protection - Shall be required when engineering technology is 
insufficient to control the noise level, and the ambient exposure limit 
exceeds those allowed in Table G-16 of 29 CFR 1910.95. Emergency alarms shall 
be distinguishable when hearing protection is worn. The sound level meters 
used to measure noise levels shall be certified by NIOSH in accordance with 24 
CFR 82. Where the potential for explosion exists, the sound level meters 
shall be of an explosion proof design.
(f) Respiratory Protection - Shall be determined by the qualified person 
based upon conditions and test results of the confined space, and the work 
activity to be performed. Halfmask respirators are not recommended for use in 
any atmosphere greater than 10 x PEL because of the probability of accidently 
breaking the facepiece to face seal due to the work condition in a confined 
space. Also, gas masks designed for the same respiratory protection may be 
substituted for chemical cartridge respirators in the table (see Appendix II), 
but they are more cumbersome and restrictive to movement. The minimum service 
time of self-contained breathing apparatus shall be calculated on the entry 
time, plus the maximum work period, plus twice the estimated escape time for 
safety margin.
The respirators used shall be NIOSH and MSHA approved devices and shall be 
fitted and maintained in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.134. However, supplied- 
air respirators purchased before 1975 and bearing Bureau of Mines approval may 
be used until March 31, 1980. Self-contained breathing apparatus, with
audible alarms and all gas masks, approved by the Bureau of Mines may be used 
until further notice.
(g) Hand Protection - If hands are exposed to rough surfaces or sharp 
edges, the degree of protection can range from canvas to metal mesh gloves, 
depending on the material handled. Gloves made of impervious rubber or 
similar material are to be worn to protect against toxic or irritating 
materials. Heat protective gloves are required when employees handle objects 
with temperatures greater than 60 C (140 F). Where a current flow through the 
body of more than 5 milliamperes may result from contact with energized 
electrical equipment, employees shall wear insulating gloves that have been 
visually inspected before each use. Above 5,000 volts, rubber gloves in 
accordance with 29 CFR 1910.137 shall be worn.
Additional safety equipment that is necessary to protect the worker in the 
environment of a confined space: a safety belt with "D" rings for attaching a
life line shall be worn at all times; the combination of a body harness and/or 
safety belt with life line shall be used when an employee is required to enter 
to complete the gas analysis; when an employee is working in an area where 
entry for purposes of rescue would be contraindicated (special limitations or 
fire hazard); when any failure of ventilation would allow the build-up of 
toxic or explosive gases within the time necessary to evacuate the area, or 
when the atmosphere is Immediately dangerous to life and health. Safety belts 
may be used as the primary means of suspension for the life line only when 
rescue may be made by keeping the disabled body in a position that will 
maintain easy passage through exit openings. If the exit opening is less than 
18 inches (45 cm) in diameter, then a wrist type harness shall be used. When 
it is determined by the qualified person that none of the special hazards 
associated with confined spaces pose an immediate threat to life, as in a 
Class C entry, then life lines shall be readily available but not used during 
entry and work procedures.
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Other protective measures shall include: safety nets used to protect
employees working 10 feet (3 m) above ground or grade level when other 
protective devices are impractical; life jackets worn if the workers are 
exposed to falls into liquid over 4 feet (1.2 m) in depth; and insulated floor 
mats when hot work requires use of electrical energy.
When employees enter a confined space, a barricade shall be erected if 
inadvertent entry poses a problem. The barricade shall have a mechanism to 
prevent closure of the escapeway, signs warning of the danger present, a 
physical barrier (fence) to keep the area clear, and an adequate platform (3 
feet x 3 feet as a minimum) for entry or exit. Such added features as a
tripod with block and tackle for safety lines and communication equipment
should be considered when the entry plan is formulated. The employer shall be 
responsible for maintenance of the barricade system.
Section 9 - Work Practices (Class A, B, and C)
Before entering a confined space, employees shall review the specific 
guidelines appropriate for safe entry and emergency exit. These guidelines or 
standards shall be compiled by the qualified person and be definitive on all 
the possible hazards. Areas covered by such guidelines shall follow this 
recommended standard.
(a) Purging and Ventilating (Class A, B)
Environmental control within a confined space is accomplished by purging 
and ventilating. The method used will be determined by the potential hazards 
that arise due to the product stored or produced, suspected contaminants, the 
work to be performed, and the design of the confined space. When ventilating 
and/or purging operations are to be performed, the blower controls shall be at 
a safe distance from the confined space. In a Class A entry, an audible 
warning device shall be installed in all equipment to signal when there is a 
ventilation failure. When a ventilation system is operational, air flow 
measurements shall be made before each workshift to ensure that a safe 
environmental level is maintained. Initial testing of the atmosphere shall be 
performed from outside the confined space before ventilation begins to 
determine what precautions are necessary in purging and ventilating. Testing 
of more remote regions within the confined space may be performed once the 
immediate area within the confined space has been made safe. Exhaust systems 
shall be designed to protect workers in the surrounding area from contaminated 
air. If flammable concentrations are present all electrical equipment shall 
comply with the requirements of NEC (NFPA no. 70) hazardous locations, and the 
bonding requirements of Article 250 of NEC, 1978. Where continuous 
ventilation is not a part of the operating procedure, the atmosphere shall be 
tested until continuous acceptable levels of oxygen and contaminants are 
maintained for three tests at 5-minute intervals. Care shall be taken to 
prevent recirculation of contaminated air and interaction of airborne 
contaminants.
Continuous general ventilation shall be maintained where toxic atmospheres 
are produced as part of a work procedure, such as welding or painting, or 
where a toxic atmosphere may develop due to the nature of the confined space, 
as in the case of desorption from walls, or evaporation of residual chemicals. 
General ventilation is an effective procedure for distributing contaminants
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from a local generation point throughout the work space to obtain maximum 
dilution. However, special precautions shall be taken if the ventilating 
system partially blocks the exit opening. These precautions include a method 
for providing respirable air to each worker for the time necessary for exit, 
and a method of maintaining communications.
Local exhaust ventilation shall be provided when general ventilation is 
not effective due to restrictions in the confined space or when high 
concentrations of contaminants occur in the breathing zone of the worker. 
Local high concentrations of contaminants may occur during work activities 
such as welding, painting, and chemical cleaning. The worker shall not be 
exposed to concentrations of contaminants in excess of those specified in 29 
CFR Part 1910 Sub Part Z. Therefore, respiratory protection, as recommended 
in Section 8 , may be needed in addition to engineering controls. The use of 
respiratory protection will be determined by the qualified person. However, 
when fumes may be generated that contain highly toxic or other airborne metal 
contaminants, the provisions of 29 CFR 1910.252 shall be observed. When 
freely moving exhaust hoods are used to provide control of fumes generated 
during welding, such hoods shall maintain a velocity of 100 feet per/minute in 
the zone of the welding. The effective force of freely moving exhaust hoods 
is decreased by approximately 90% at a distance of one duct diameter from the 
plane of the exhaust opening. Therefore, to obtain maximum effectiveness the 
welder shall re-position the exhaust hood as he changes welding locations to 
keep the hood in close proximity to the fume source.
Special precautions shall be taken when outgassing or vaporization of 
toxic and/or flammable substances are likely. If the vapor-generating rate 
can be determined, the exhaust rate required can be calculated to dilute the 
atmosphere below the PEL and/or 10% of the LFL, whichever is the lower. This 
shall be the lowest acceptable ventilation rate. If the area of concern is 
relatively small, diffusion of the contaminants may be controlled by enclosure 
with a relatively low volume exhaust for control, or by exhaust hoods located 
as close as possible to the area of vaporization or outgassing. If the area 
to be ventilated is too extensive to be controlled by local exhaust, then 
general ventilation procedures shall be used to control the contaminant level. 
When the problem of outgassing is due to the application of protective 
coatings or paint, ventilation shall be continued until the build-up of a 
flammable and/or toxic atmosphere is no longer possible.
There are three components necessary for combustionr fuel, oxygen, and a 
source of ignition. If work with fire becomes necessary in a confined space 
and the source of fuel cannot be controlled, then the atmosphere shall be 
inerted. This is a highly hazardous work situation, and continuous monitoring 
of the inert make-up ventilation is mandatory. Monitoring shall include flow 
measurement as well as gas analysis. The inerting operation shall be 
continuously monitored and supervised by the qualified person. Since every 
confined space will have its own infiltration rate, inerting shall continue 
for the entire duration of the work at a rate that will prevent air from 
entering the confined space.
(b) Isolation/Lockout/Tagging (Class A, B)
The isolation procedures shall be specific for each type of confined 
space. Safety equipment required during this procedure shall be designated by 
the qualified person and be dependent upon the potential hazards involved. A
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Class A or B confined space shall be completely isolated from all other 
systems by physical disconnection, double block and bleed, or blanking off all 
lines. In continuous systems, where complete isolation is not possible, such 
as sewers or utility tunnels, specific written safety procedures that are 
approved and enforced by the employer shall be used. Blanks used to seal off 
lines shall be capable of withstanding the maximum working pressure or load of 
the line (with a minimum safety factor of 4), be provided with a gasket on the 
pressure side to insure a leakproof seal, and be made of chemically non- 
reactive material. Shutoff valves serving the confined space, shall be locked 
in the closed position and tagged for Identification. In addition to 
blanking, pumps and compressors serving these lines entering the confined 
space shall be locked out to prevent accidental activation.
All blanks for that specific confined space shall be recorded on the entry 
permit and recorded in the employer’s file, which shall be available for 
inspection.
If a drain line is located within the confined space, provision shall be 
made when necessary to tag it and leave it open. This shall also be recorded 
on the entry permit.
Additional procedures, which are necessary when the confined space is of a 
double wall type construction, eg, water jacketed or similar type, shall be 
determined by the qualified person and noted on the entry permit.
Electrical isolation of the confined space to prevent accidental 
activation of moving parts that would be hazardous to the worker is achieved 
by locking circuit breakers and/or disconnects in the open (off) position with 
a key-type padlock. The only key is to remain with the person working inside 
the confined space. If more than one person is inside the confined space, 
each person shall place his own lock on the circuit breaker. In addition to 
the lockout system, there must be an accompanying tag that identifies the 
operation and prohibits use.
Mechanical isolation of moving parts can be achieved by disconnecting 
linkages, or removing drive belts or chains. Equipment with moving mechanical 
parts shall also be blocked in such a manner that there can be no accidental 
rotation.
(c) Cleaning (Class A, B, and C)
Procedures and processes used to clean the inside of a confined space 
shall be reviewed and authorized by the qualified person. The method to be 
prescribed shall be dependent upon the product in the space. If the confined 
space contains a flammable atmosphere above the upper flammable limit, it 
shall be purged with an inert gas to remove the flammable substance before 
ventilating with air. Initial cleaning shall be done from outside the tank if 
at all possible.
Special procedures should be adopted to handle the hazards created by the 
cleaning process itself. For example: if the tank is steamed, (1) it shall
be allowed to cool prior to entry; (2) ventilation shall be maintained during 
neutralization procedures to prevent build-up of toxic materials; (3) steaming 
shall not be used as a cleaning method vrtien the product stored was a liquid 
with an autoignition temperature 120% or less of the steam temperature, and
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(4) the pipe or nozzle of the steam hose shall be bonded to the tank to
decrease the generation of static electricity that could accumulate in tanks 
during steaming procedures. These and other hazards and controls shall be
evaluated by the qualified person.
(d) Equipment and Tools (Class A, B, and C)
Equipment and tools to be used in a confined space shall be carefully
inspected and shall meet the following requirements:
(1) Hand tools shall be kept clean and in good repair.
(2) Portable electric tools, equipment, and lighting shall be 
approved in accordance with 29 CFR Part 1910 Sub Part S and be equipped with a
ground fault circuit interrupter that meets the requirements of 29 CFR
1910.309. All grounds shall be checked before electrical equipment is used in 
a confined space.
(3) All electrical cords, tools, and equipment shall be of heavy 
duty type with heavy duty insulation and inspected for visually detectable 
defects before use in a confined space.
(4) Air driven power tools shall be used when flammable liquids are 
present. The use of air driven power tools will reduce the risk of explosion, 
not eliminate it. Explosions can arise by tools overheating (drilling), 
sparks produced by striking (percussion), grinding or discharge of accumulated 
electrostatic charges developed from the flow of compressed air.
(5) Lighting used in Class A and B confined spaces shall be of
explosion proof design and where necessary, equipped with guards. Only 
equipment listed by the Underwriters Laboratories for use in Division 1, 
atmospheres of the appropriate class and group, or approved by U.S. Bureau of
Mines or Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration or Mine Safety and
Health Administration, or the US Coast Guard shall be used. Lighting shall 
not be hung by electric cords, unless specifically designed for that purpose. 
The illumination of the work area shall be sufficient to provide for safe work 
conditions as referenced in the ANSI standard All-1-1965, or the revision, 
1970. Under no circumstances will matches or open flames be used in a 
confined space for illumination.
(6) Cylinders of compressed gases shall never be taken into a 
confined space, and shall be turned off at the cylinder valve when not in use. 
Exempt from this rule are cylinders that are part of self-contained breathing 
apparatus or resuscitation equipment.
(7) Ladders shall be adequately secured, or of a permanent type 
which provides the same degree of safety as cited in 29 CFR Part 1910 Sub Part
D.
(8) Scaffolding and staging shall be properly designed to carry 
maximum expected load (safety factor of 4), be equipped with traction type 
planking, and meet the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.28.
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(9) Electrical lines, junctions and appurtenances will be in 
accordance with National Electrical Code (NEC) and National Fire code (NFC) as 
cited in 29 CFR 1910.309.
(10) Only hose lines and components designed specially for the 
compressed gas and working pressure shall be used, and such systems shall have 
a pressure relief valve outside the confined space.
(11) All equipment that may be used in a flammable atmosphere shall 
be approved as explosion proof or intrinsically safe for the atmosphere 
involved by a recognized testing laboratory such as the US Bureau of Mines, 
MESA, or MSHA for methane and by the Underwriters Laboratories or by Factory 
Mutual for all cases.
(e) Recordkeeping (Class A, B)
The employer shall maintain a written record of training including safety 
drills, inspections, tests, and maintenance. The records shall be retained 1 
year after the last date of training, inspection, test, or maintenance. In 
the event of separation of the employee, disposal of equipment or appliance, 
records may be disposed of after 1 year.
Where atmospheric testing indicates the presence of a toxic substance, 
records shall be maintained in accordance with the existing Federal 
regulation(s). These records shall include the dates and times of 
measurements, duties and location of the employees within the confined space, 
sampling and analytical methods used, number, duration, and results of the 
samples taken, PEL concentrations estimated from these samples, type of 
personal protective equipment used, if any, and employees' names. These 
records shall be made available to the designated representatives of the 
Secretary of Labor, of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, of the 
employer, and of the employee or former employee.
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I I . INTRODUCTION
This document presents the criteria and the recommended standard based 
thereon that were prepared to meet the need for preventing occupational 
injuries and deaths associated with persons entering, working in, and exiting 
confined spaces. This document does not address the specialized areas of 
radiation, inert atmospheres or hyperbaric atmospheres; except to recognize 
they do exist and represent a potential hazard. The criteria document
fulfills the responsibility of the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, under Section 20(a)(2) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 to "...develop and establish recommended occupational safety and health 
standards."
After reviewing data and consulting with others, NIOSH developed criteria 
upon which standards can be established to protect the health and to provide 
for the safety of workers exposed to occupational hazards. It should be noted 
that criteria for a recommended standard should enable management and labor to 
develop better work practices and more appropriate training programs that will 
result in safer work environments. Simply complying with the recommended 
standard should not be the final goal.
The worker who enters a confined space may be, or often is exposed to 
multiple hazards due primarily either to ignorance of the potential hazards or 
negligence in the enforcement of safety regulations. Ignorance and negligence 
have led to deaths by asphyxiation, by fire and explosion, and by fatal 
exposure to toxic materials. NIOSH is aware that a number of deaths occur 
each year when workers must enter and work in a confined space, and it 
recognizes that due to current data collection methods, an estimate of the 
injuries and deaths which do occur will be inaccurate. Also, since there is 
no specific Standard Industrial Classification where these injuries and deaths 
are recorded for confined spaces, they are recorded in several different 
categories, thereby giving the appearance of a limited exposure to the hazard.
These criteria for a standard are a part of a continuing series of 
documents published by NIOSH. The proposed standard applies only to entering 
into, working in, and exiting from confined spaces as applicable under the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.
The method used in this study consisted of developing, evaluating, and 
recording information from extensive literature searches, site visits to 
various industries, and consultation with reviewers knowledgeable on the 
subject of confined spaces.
Standards covering issues of occupational safety and health that are of 
general application without regard to any specific industry are intended to be 
applicable to this recommended standard even though no specific reference is 
made to them. Examples of these general areas are: exposure to toxic
chemicals, noise, temperature extremes, and general duty requirements.
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III. CONFINED SPACE HAZARDS
(a) Overview
The hazards encountered and associated with entering and working In 
confined spaces are capable of causing bodily Injury, Illness, and death to 
the worker. Accidents occur among workers because of failure to recognize
that a confined space is a potential hazard. It should therefore be 
considered that the most unfavorable situation exists in every case and that 
the danger of explosion, poisoning, and asphyxiation will be present at the 
onset of entry.
Before forced ventilation is initiated, information such as restricted 
areas within the confined space, voids, the nature of the contaminants 
present, the size of the space, the type of work to be performed, and the 
number of people involved should be considered. The ventilation air should 
not create an additional hazard due to recirculation of contaminants, improper 
arrangement of the inlet duct, or by the substitution of anything other than 
fresh (normal) air (approximately 20.9% oxygen, 79.1% nitrogen by volume). 
The terms air and oxygen are sometimes considered synonymous. However, this 
is a dangerous assumption, since the use of oxygen in place of fresh (normal) 
air for ventilation will expand the limits of flammability and increase the 
hazards of fire and explosion.
Hazardous conditions to be discussed in this Chapter include: Hazardous
Atmospheres (flammable, toxic, irritant, and asphyxiating), and General Safety 
Hazards (mechanical, communications, entry and exit, and physical).
An estimation of the number of workers potentially exposed to confined 
spaces would be difficult to produce. A report prepared under contract for 
NIOSH [1] shows that the rate of confined space related injuries in the 
shipbuilding and repair industry is 4.8%. Projected on a national level, 
2,448 accidents per year may be attributed to the hazards of working in 
confined spaces in this single Industry. The Bureau of Labor Statistics shows 
that the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 373, Shipbuilding and Repair 
Industry, has a 23.9% injury rate. Based on this injury rate 5% of all 
accidents in the Shipbuilding and Repair Industry occur while working in and 
around confined spaces. Because of the lack of data it is not possible at 
this time to project this proportion of confined space related injuries to 
other industries [2]. Based on the total working population of selected
specific SIC codes, and a rough estimate of the percentage of each category
who may work in confined spaces at some time, NIOSH estimates that millions of 
workers may be exposed to hazards in confined spaces each year.
(b) Types of Confined Spaces
Confined spaces can be categorized generally as those with open tops and 
with a depth that will restrict the natural movement of air, and enclosed
spaces with very limited openings for entry [3]. In either of these cases the
space may contain mechanical equipment with moving parts. Any combination of 
these parameters will change the nature of the hazards encountered. 
Degreasers, pits, and certain types of storage tanks may be classified as open
Overview and Magnitude of the Problem
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topped confined spaces that usually contain no moving parts. However, gases 
that are heavier than air (butane, propane, and other hydrocarbons) remain in 
depressions and will flow to low points where they are difficult to remove
[4]. Open topped water tanks that appear harmless may develop toxic 
atmospheres such as hydrogen sulfide from the vaporization of contaminated 
water [5]. Therefore, these gases (heavier than air) are a primary concern 
when entry into such a confined space is being planned. Other hazards may 
develop due to the work performed in the confined space or because of 
corrosive residues that accelerate the decomposition of scaffolding supports 
and electrical components.
Confined spaces such as sewers, casings, tanks, silos, vaults, and 
compartments of ships usually have limited access. The problems arising in 
these areas are similar to those that occur in open topped confined spaces. 
However, the limited access increases the risk of injury. Gases which are 
heavier than air such as carbon dioxide and propane, may lie in a tank or 
vault for hours or even days after the containers have been opened [6]. 
Because some gases are odorless, the hazard may be overlooked with fatal 
results. Gases that are lighter than air may also be trapped within an 
enclosed type confined space, especially those with access from the bottom or 
side.
Hazards specific to a confined space are dictated by: (1) the material
stored or used in the confined space; as an example, damp activated carbon in 
a filtration tank will absorb oxygen thus creating an oxygen deficient 
atmosphere [7]; (2) the activity carried out, such as the fermentation of 
molasses that creates ethyl alcohol vapors and decreases the oxygen content of 
the atmosphere [8]; or (3) the external environment, as in the case of sewer 
systems that may be affected by high tides, heavier than air gases, or flash 
floods [9].
The most hazardous kind of confined space is the type that combines 
limited access and mechanical devices. All the hazards of open top and 
limited access confined spaces may be present together with the additional 
hazard of moving parts. Digesters and boilers usually contain power-driven 
equipment which, unless properly isolated, may be inadvertently activated 
after entry. Such equipment may also contain physical hazards that further 
complicate the work environment and the entry and exit process.
(c) Reasons for Entering Confined Spaces
Entering a confined space as part of the industrial activity may be done 
for various reasons. It is done usually to perform a necessary function, such 
as inspection, repair, maintenance (cleaning or painting), or similar 
operations which would be an infrequent or irregular function of the total 
industrial activity [10].
Entry may also be made during new construction. Potential hazards should 
be easier to recognize during construction since the confined space has not 
been used. The types of hazards involved will be limited by the specific work 
practices. When the area meets the criteria for a confined space, all 
ventilation and other requirements should be enforced.
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One of the most difficult entries to control is that of unauthorized 
entry, especially when there are large numbers of workers and trades involved, 
such as welders, painters, electricians, and safety monitors.
A final and most important reason for entry would be emergency rescue. 
This, and all other reasons for entry, must be well planned before initial 
entry is made and the hazards must be thoroughly reviewed. The standby person 
and all rescue personnel should be aware of the structural design of the 
space, emergency exit procedures, and life support systems required.
Hazardous Atmospheres
Hazardous atmospheres encountered in confined spaces can be divided into 
four distinct categories: (a) Flammable, (b) Toxic, (c) Irritant and/or 
Corrosive, and (d) Asphyxiating.
(a) Flammable Atmosphere
A flammable atmosphere generally arises from enriched oxygen atmospheres, 
vaporization of flammable liquids, byproducts of work, chemical reactions, 
concentrations of combustible dusts, and desorption of chemicals from inner 
surfaces of the confined space.
Alther [11] reported on a case involving workers in an enriched oxygen 
atmosphere. Two men entered a newly constructed tank to repair a bulge which 
had formed after the flange of the manhole was welded to the tank. The 
planned repair procedure was to have two men enter the tank with a jack to 
force the flange of the manhole into place while a third worker heated the 
bulge from the outside. To accomplish this procedure the men had to close the 
manhole. To improve the air within the tank, oxygen used for welding was 
blown in through an opening. A worker on the outside noticed through the 
opening that the hair of one of the workmen inside was on fire. The cover was 
immediately removed and one of the workers managed to escape, his clothing was 
burning rapidly, the second worker had collapsed and remained unconscious 
inside. It became necessary to invert the tank to remove the unconscious 
workman. Both workmen who were doing the work inside suffered serious burns. 
One died a short time later; the second was hospitalized for several months. 
A rescuer in the operation was burned on the hands.
Investigation of the accident revealed the use of oxygen in place of 
normal air increased the flammability range of combustibles. Enrichment of 
the atmosphere with only a few percent of oxygen above 21% will cause an 
increase in the range of flammability, hair as well as clothing will absorb 
the oxygen and burn violently. Enriched oxygen atmospheres which expand the 
region of flammability could be the result of improper blanking off of oxygen 
lines, chemical reactions which liberate oxygen, or inadvertently purging the 
space with oxygen in place of air [11].
An atmosphere becomes flammable when the ratio of oxygen to combustible 
material in the air is neither too rich nor too lean for combustion to occur. 
Combustible gases or vapors will accumulate when there is inadequate 
ventilation in areas such as a confined space. Flammable gases such as 
acetylene, butane, propane, hydrogen, methane, natural or manufactured gases 
or vapors from liquid hydrocarbons can be trapped in confined spaces, and
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since many gases are heavier than air, they will seek lower levels as in pits, 
sewers, and various types of storage tanks and vessels [12,13]. In a closed 
top tank, it should also be noted that lighter than air gases may rise and 
develop a flammable concentration if trapped above the opening.
The byproducts of work procedures can generate flammable or explosive 
conditions within a confined space. Specific kinds of work such as spray 
painting can result in the release of explosive gases or vapors [14]. Table 
III-3 shows that approximately one-third of the events identified as 
"atmospheric condition" were the result of the victims performing activities 
that generated fumes or depleted the oxygen supply. The most common of these 
activities was welding in a confined space. Welding in a confined space was a 
major cause for explosions in areas that contained combustible gas [1],
Chemical reactions forming flammable atmospheres occur when surfaces are 
initially exposed to the atmosphere, or when chemicals combine to form 
flammable gases. This condition arises when dilute sulfuric acid reacts with 
iron to form hydrogen or when calcium carbide makes contact with water to form 
acetylene. Other examples of spontaneous chemical reactions that may produce 
explosions from small amounts of unstable compounds are acetylene-metal 
compounds, peroxides, and nitrates. In a dry state these compounds have the 
potential to explode upon percussion or exposure to increased temperature. 
Another class of chemical reactions that form flammable atmospheres arise from 
deposits of pyrophoric substances (carbon, ferrous oxide, ferrous sulfate, 
iron, etc) that can be found in tanks used by the chemical and petroleum 
industry. Th^se tanks containing flammable deposits, will spontaneously 
ignite upon exposure to air [15].
Combustible dust concentrations are usually found during the process of 
loading, unloading, and conveying grain products, nitrated fertilizers, finely 
ground chemical products, and any other combustible material. It has been 
reported that high charges of static electricity, which rapidly accumulate 
during periods of relatively low humidity (below 50%) , can cause certain 
substances to accumulate electrostatic charges of sufficient energy to produce 
sparks and ignite a flammable atmosphere [14]. These sparks may also cause 
explosions when the right air or oxygen to dust or gas mixture is present.
Desorption of chemicals from the inner surfaces of a confined space is 
another process that may produce a flammable atmosphere. This is often a 
natural phenomenon in which the partial pressure at the interface between the 
surfaces and the stored chemical is radically reduced. For example, after 
liquid propane is removed from a storage tank the walls of the vessel may 
desorb the remaining gas from the porous surface of the confined space.
Dorias [16] reported on an explosive gas-air mixture in a horizontal 
cylindrical container (1000 m3), which had contained liquid propane. The 
cylinder was emptied to check for stress cracking. The space was to be filled 
with water to expell the gas, and drained so it could automatically fill with 
normal air. The container was presumably filled full of water and drained. 
The gas analysis of the resulting space showed an explosive gas-air mixture. 
The procedure of filling with water and draining was repeated and the test 
results were the same, an explosive gas-air mixture. To speed up the process, 
a man climbed into the cylinder and sprayed the interior with water for 3 
hours, and allowed the interior to air dry. On the 4th day, a mechanic 
entered the tank and prepared the areas to be inspected for stress. Following
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this, a man entered the tank with a test device and a Katel lamp (220 volts 
not of an explosion-proof design). There was a sudden explosion and flame 
streamed out of the entry manhole. The man who was testing the atmosphere 
suffered severe injuries from which he died 6 days later. Investigation of 
the events revealed that the tanks were filled only 50% full the first time 
and only 80-90% full the second time. Therefore, it was concluded the space 
was never thoroughly emptied of all gas. Reconstruction of the operation 
showed that the spraying operation did not remove all the propane, and left a 
gas-air mixture of approximately 5% propane by volume, an extremely explosive 
condition [16].
(b) Toxic Atmospheres
The substances to be regarded as toxic in a confined space can cover the 
entire spectrum of gases, vapors, and finely-divided airborne dust in industry 
[17]. The sources of toxic atmospheres encountered may arise from the 
following:
(1) The manufacturing process (for example, in producing polyvinyl 
chloride, hydrogen chloride is used as well as vinyl chloride monomer which is 
carcinogenic).
(2) The product stored (removing decomposed organic material from a 
tank can liberate toxic substances such as H^S).
(3) The operation performed in the confined space (for example,
welding or brazing with metals capable of producing toxic fumes).
Zavon [18] reported, in 1970, that four employees of a local utility were 
repairing a water meter in an underground vault 18 feet x 6 feet x 5 feet with 
an opening 24 inches in diameter. To make the repairs, it was necessary to
cut 26 cadmium plated bolts with an oxygen propane torch. Two men worked in
the vault with one man cutting and the other standing beside him. Neither man 
wore a respirator and no ventilation was provided. Two other men remained on 
the surface. During the cutting of the bolts with the oxygen propane torch, a 
"heavy blue smoke" filled the vault. This smoke was exhausted after the 
cutting was completed.
The 56-year-old man who had cut the bolts died 17 days after exposure. He 
became nauseated shortly after the job and was seen by his family physician 
the next day for fever (102-103 F), chest pain, cough, and sore throat. On 
the 4th day following the incident he was in greater distress and was 
hospitalized. Death occurred in 2 weeks and was attributed to massive 
coronary infarction and corpulmonale. The 29-year-old assistant complained of 
chills, nausea, cough and difficulty in breathing. He was treated for 
pneumonia and made a slow recovery. A reenactment of the work demonstrated 
that the exposure to cadmium was well above the threshold limit value of "0 .1  
mg/m3” [18]. Symptoms attributed to cadmium poisoning include: severe labored 
breathing and wheezing, chest pain, persistent cough, weakness and malaise, 
and loss of appetite. The clinical course is similar in most cases. The 
injured frequently are well enough to work the day after exposure, but their 
conditions deteriorate until approximately the 5th day. At this point, the 
exposed worker will either get much worse or begin to improve [19].
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Toxic gases may be evolved when acids are used for cleaning. Hydrochloric 
acid can react chemically with iron sulfide to produce hydrogen sulfide [20], 
Iron sulfide is formed on the walls of cooling jackets when only several parts 
per million sulfide are in the water used in the cooling process. As an 
example, 5 men were overcome while cleaning a heat exchanger using a 
hydrochloric acid solution [2 0].
Another area where the hydrogen sulfide hazard exists is in the tanning 
industry. Lime pits used in the process of removing hair from the hides 
contain in addition to lime, a 1% solution of sodium sulfate (Na^SOit). Acid 
dichromate solution is also used in the tanning process. If these two 
solutions (sodium sulfate and acid dichromate) are combined accidentally, 
hydrogen sulfide (H2S) will be produced. One such incident occurred when 
several unused pits at a tannery were being cleaned. Sludge had formed on the 
bottom of the pit due to drainage from the hides when they had been treated 
with lime and acid dichromate. When men entered the pit to clear the drain 
line, they were overcome. Because of the high specific gravity of hydrogen 
sulfide, the gas formed by the sodium sulfide-dichromate reaction had settled 
in the pit, and when the sludge was stirred the released gas overcame the 
workers. In this instance, 5 men became unconscious and two died [21]. The 
particular hazard associated with hydrogen sulfide at higher concentrations is 
due to its physiological effect of anesthetizing the olfactory nerves and can 
also cause a loss of reasoning, paralysis of the respiratory system, 
unconsciousness, and death [22,23].
During loading, unloading, formulation, and production, mechanical and/or 
human error may also produce toxic gases which are not part of the planned 
operation.
Toxic solvents, which present problems [24], such as trichloroethylene, 
methyl chloroform, and dichloromethane, are used in industry for cleaning and 
degreasing. Acrylonitrile, infrequently used, has been encountered as an 
ingredient in a protective coating applied to tank interiors [17].
Trichloroethane and dichloroethane are widely used in industry as cleaning 
solvents because they are among the least toxic of the chlorinated aliphatic
hydrocarbons. These solvents have been used as a replacement for carbon
tetrachloride and trichloroethylene [25-27].
In a case report by Hatfield and Maykoski [28] trichloroethane, also known 
as methyl chloroform was substituted for trichloroethylene because of the high 
toxicity of the latter. A radiator and metal tank repairman was involved in 
an aircraft tip tank cleaning and assembly operation. The technique of 
cleaning the interior of the tanks varied among workers. Some workmen would 
moisten a pad with solvent and would hand wipe the metal surfaces by reaching 
through an opening on the end of the tank; some would use pads on the end of a 
shaft, while others would climb inside and clean. One particular worker would 
saturate a pad with solvent and lower himself head first into the down-tilted 
tip of the tank and clean as fast as possible. This worker was found with his 
legs protruding from the upper end of the 450 gallon tank and was
unresponsive. He was removed immediately and was given artificial respiration
until a physician arrived and pronounced him dead.
Reconstruction of the fatal accident revealed the concentration of methyl 
chloroform in the tank had reached 62,000 ppm. The workers assumed that since
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the new cleaning solvent was less toxic than the one previously used, there 
was less danger. However, the new cleaning solvent, methyl chloroform, is a 
potent anesthetic at 30,000 ppm, which was less than half the concentration 
level in the worker's breathing zone.
The compatibility of materials must be considered when structural members 
and equipment are introduced in confined spaces. The previous history of the 
confined space must be carefully evaluated to avoid reactions with residual 
chemicals, wall scale, and sludge which can be highly reactive. One such case 
was reported in May of 1968, when an aluminum ladder was used for entry into a 
chemical evaporating tank which had contained aqueous sodium arsenite (Na As02 
H 20) and sodium hydroxide (NaOH). The aluminum reacted with the NaAs02 dnd 
the NaOH to liberate hydrogen, which in turn reacted with the arsenic to form 
arsine [29], Other cases of incompatability arise from the use of chemical 
cleaning agents. The initial step in chemical cleaning usually is the 
conversion of the scale or sludge into a liquid state which may cause
poisonous gases to be liberated. In 1974, several employees who were cleaning 
a boiler tank prior to repairing a leak used a cleaning fluid, Vestan 675. 
The cleaning action caused the release of ammonia fumes that were not properly 
exhausted. The men were hospitalized with severe chest pains, but recovered 
[29].
Another hazardous gas that may build up in a confined space is carbon
monoxide (CO). This odorless colorless gas that has approximately the same
density of air is formed from Incomplete combustion of organic materials such 
as wood, coal, gas, oil, and gasoline [30]; it can be formed from microbial 
decomposition of organic matter In sewers, silos, and fermentation tanks.
Carbon monoxide is an insidious toxic gas because of Its poor warning 
properties. Early stages of carbon monoxide intoxication are nausea and 
headache. Carbon monoxide may be fatal at 1000 ppm in air, and is considered 
dangerous at 200 ppm, because it forms carboxyhemoglobin in the blood which 
prevents the distribution of oxygen in the body.
Carbon monoxide (CO) is a relatively abundant colorless, odorless gas, 
therefore, any untested atmosphere must be suspect. It must also be noted 
that a safe reading on a combustible gas indicator does not ensure that CO is 
not present [14]. Carbon monoxide must be tested for specifically. The 
formation of CO may result from chemical reactions or work activities, 
therefore, fatalities due to CO poisoning are not confined to any particular 
industry. There have been fatal accidents in sewage treatment plants [8] due 
to decomposition products and lack of ventilation in confined spaces. Another 
area where CO results as a product of decomposition is in the formation of 
silo gas in grain storage elevators [8 ]. In another area, the paint industry, 
varnish is manufactured by introducing the various Ingredients into a kettle, 
and heating them in an inert atmosphere, usually town gas, which is a mixture 
of carbon dioxide and nitrogen. In one accident report, a maintenance 
engineer entered a kettle that had been vented for 12-24 hours to check a 
blocked sampling tube. He was found dead some time later. Death was due to 
carbon monoxide poisoning. Investigation into the inert gas supply system 
revealed that the CO content of the town gas was over 1% (10,000 ppm), and 
that there were minor faults in the protective valves into the kettle so that 
a small leak was occurring. The employee had entered an atmosphere of reduced 
oxygen partial pressure containing CO and had succumbed before he could save 
himself [21]. In many cases CO poisoning occurs because of poor work 
practices.
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In welding operations, oxides of nitrogen and ozone are gases of major 
toxicologic importance, and incomplete oxidation may occur and carbon monoxide 
can form as a byproduct [31]. One such case, documented in the Pennsylvania 
Occupational Injury Files of 1975, involved an employee who was overcome by
carbon monoxide while welding inside a copper heat-treating oven with the door 
partially closed.
Another poor work practice, which has led to fatalities, is the 
recirculation of diesel exhaust emissions [32]. Tests have shown that 
although the initial hazard due to exhaust toxicants may be from increased CO2 
levels (or depleted 0 2) » the most immediate hazard to life processes is CO
[33]. Increased CO levels can only be prevented by strict control of the 
ventilation or the use of catalytic convertors.
(c) Irritant (Corrosive) Atmosphere
Irritant or corrosive atmospheres can be divided into primary and
secondary groups. The primary irritants exert no systemic toxic effects
because the products formed by them on tissues of the respiratory tract are
non-irritant, and other Irritant effects are so violent as to obscure any 
systemic toxic action. Examples of primary irritants are chlorine (CI2 ), 
ozone (03), hydrochloric acid (HC1), hydrofluoric acid (HF), sulfuric acid 
(H2S0^), nitrogen dioxide (NO2) , ammonia (NH3), and sulfur dioxide (S02). A 
secondary irritant is one that may produce systemic toxic effects in addition 
to surface irritation. Examples of secondary irritants Include benzene 
(C6He), carbon tetrachloride (CCl^ ) , ethyl chloride (CH3CH2CI), 
trichloroethane (CH^CCL3), trichloroethylene (CHC1CC12), and chloropropene
(allyl chloride-CH2CHCH2C1) [34].
Irritant gases vary widely among all areas of industrial activity. They 
can be found in plastics plants, chemical plants, the petroleum industry, 
tanneries, refrigeration industries, paint manufacturing, and mining 
operations [17].
Prolonged exposure at irritant or corrosive concentrations in a confined 
space may produce little or no evidence of irritation. This has been 
interpreted to mean that the worker has become adapted to the harmful agent
involved. In reality, it means there has been a general weakening of the
defense reflexes from changes in sensitivity, due to damage of the nerve 
endings in the mucous membranes of the conjunctivae and upper respiratory 
tract. The danger in this situation is that the worker is usually not aware 
of any increase in his exposure to toxic substances [17].
(d) Asphyxiating Atmosphere
The normal atmosphere is composed approximately of 20.9% oxygen and 78.1% 
nitrogen, and 1% argon with small amounts of various other gases. Reduction 
of oxygen (02) in a confined space may be the result of either consumption or 
displacement [35].
The consumption of oxygen takes place during combustion of flammable 
substances, as in welding, heating, cutting, and brazing. A more subtle 
consumption of oxygen occurs during bacterial action, as in the fermentation 
process. Oxygen may also be consumed during chemical reactions as in the 
formation of rust on the exposed surface of the confined space (iron oxide).
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The number of people working in a confined space and the amount of their 
physical activity will also influence the oxygen consumption rate.
A second factor in oxygen deficiency is displacement by another gas. 
Examples of gases that are used to displace air, and therefore reduce the 
oxygen level are helium, argon, and nitrogen. Carbon dioxide may also be used 
to displace air and can occur naturally in sewers, storage bins, wells, 
tunnels, wine vats, and grain elevators. Aside from the natural development 
of these gases, or their use in the chemical process, certain gases are also 
used as inerting agents to displace flammable substances and retard pyrophoric 
reactions. Gases such as nitrogen, argon, helium, and carbon dioxide, are 
frequently referred to as non-toxic inert gases but have claimed many lives 
[36]. The use of nitrogen to inert a confined space has claimed more lives 
than carbon dioxide. The total displacement of oxygen by nitrogen will cause 
immediate collapse and death. Carbon dioxide and argon, with specific 
gravities of 1.53 and 1.38, respectively, (air =» 1) may lie in a tank or 
manhole for hours or days after opening [36]. Since these gases are colorless 
and odorless, they pose an immediate hazard to health unless appropriate 
oxygen measurements and ventilation are adequately carried out.
In a report by the Ontario (Canada) Health Department, an underground oil 
storage tank which required cleaning, had been blanketed with nitrogen to 
prevent oxidation of the oil. The man assigned to clean the tank dropped an 
air hose into the tank before entering. As he reached the bottom of the 
ladder, he passed out. His helper outside the tank went in to help and 
feeling faint, left without getting the man out. He went to get assistance 
from a nearby maintenance shop. Three men came to the tank and climbed down 
and all were overcome. Finally, after about 20 minutes, all four men were 
recovered with the help of the fire department. The only reason that there 
were no fatalities was that an airline in the tank was blowing air into the 
vicinity of the fallen workers [37].
Oxygen deprivation is one form of asphyxiation. While it is desirable to 
maintain the atmospheric oxygen level at 21% by volume, the body can tolerate 
deviation from this ideal. When the oxygen level falls to 17%, the first sign 
of hypoxia is a deterioration to night vision which is not noticeable until a 
normal oxygen concentration is restored. Physiologic effects are increased 
breathing volume and accelerated heartbeat. Between 14-16% physiologic 
effects are increased breathing volume, accelerated heartbeat, very poor 
muscular coordination, rapid fatigue, and intermittent respiration. Between 
6-10% the effects are nausea, vomiting, inability to perform, and 
unconsciousness. Less than 6%, spasmatic breathing, convulsive movements, and 
death in minutes [12,38].
In discussing oxygen and what constitutes an oxygen deficient atmosphere 
from a physiologic view, one must address the concept of partial pressures. 
At sea level the normal atmospheric pressure for air (20.9% 0 2 + 78.1% N2 + 1% 
Ar + trace amounts of various inert gases) is 14.7 psi or 760 mm Hg absolute. 
The partial pressure of 02 (P0¿) at sea level will be approximately 160 mm Hg. 
The concept of partial pressures is that in any mixture of gases, the total 
gas pressure is the sum of the partial pressures of all the gases [39].
The P0 2 in ambient air can be decreased by a reduction in the 0 2 level at 
constant pressure or by maintaining the percentage of 0 2 constant and 
decreasing the total atmospheric pressure as in the case at high altitudes.
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It is important not only to know the O2 percent by volume, but to understand 
the relationship of 0 2 to altitude and the concept of partial pressure. For 
example, 20.9% 0 2 in air at sea level constitutes a greater P 0 2 than 20.9% 0̂
at 5,000 feet because the total atmospheric pressure at 5,000 feet is less. 
As the P02 in the atmosphere drops, the volume of air required to maintain a 
P02 of 60 mm Hg in the alveolar space of the lungs increases. A P0 2 below 60 
mm Hg in the alveolar space is considered oxygen deficient [39].
Absorption of oxygen by the vessel or the product stored therein is 
another mechanism by which the P0 2 may be reduced and result in an oxygen 
deficient atmosphere. For example, activated carbon, usually considered as an 
innocuous material free of occupational hazard and toxicity, was responsible 
for two fatalities in a carbon filtration tank. Damp activated carbon absorbs 
oxygen and has been known to decrease the oxygen level from 21% to 4% in a 
closed vessel [7].
Montgomery et al [7] reported on two fatalities caused by the use of 
activated carbon in a water filtration vessel, (12.5 feet in diameter and 17 
feet high). The space was newly constructed, filled halfway with granular 
carbon in a slurry form (water medium), the water was drained off through a 
bottom drain, and the tank was closed off to protect it from the weather. The 
next morning two workers entered the filtration vessel to perform necessary 
adjustment^ to the carbon bed and the interior sprinkler mechanism. When the 
workmen failed to appear at lunch time, they were found dead on the carbon 
bed. However, a rescuer entered the tank without any type of respiratory 
protection and with no ill affects. Tests of the atmosphere revealed no cause 
of death, the oxygen level was 21%, hydrocarbon and hydrogen sulfide tests 
were negative.
The investigation of the fatalities revealed the following: the tank was
re-closed and re-opened the following day. No toxic gases were found; 
however, the oxygen level had dropped from 21% to 12% by volume. Other 
vessels checked at this location which had been closed for several weeks 
revealed the oxygen level was down to 2%.
In summary, it was discovered that dry carbon would not reduce the oxygen 
level significantly. Damp activated carbon, however, supposedly an innocuous 
material and free from toxicity, contributed to the death of two workers as a 




If activation of electrical or mechanical equipment would cause injury, 
each piece of equipment should be manually isolated to prevent inadvertent 
activation before workers enter or while they work in a confined space. 
[12,40]. The interplay of hazards associated with a confined space, such as 
the potential of flammable vapors or gases being present, and the build-up of 
static charge due to mechanical cleaning, such as abrasive blasting, all 
influence the precautions which must be taken.
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To prevent vapoi^ leaks, flashbacks, and other hazards, workers should 
completely Isolate the space [41]. To completely Isolate a confined space the 
closing of valves is not sufficient. All pipes must be physically 
disconnected or isolation blanks bolted in place [5]. Other special 
precautions must be taken in cases where flammable liquids or vapors may re- 
contaminate the confirmed space. The pipes blanked or disconnected should be 
inspected and tested for leakage to check the effectiveness of the procedure. 
Other areas of concern) are steam valves, pressure lines, and chemical transfer 
pipes. A less apparent hazard is the,space referred to as a void, such as 
double walled vessels, which must be given special consideration in blanking 
off and inerting.
(b) Communication Problems
Communication between the worker inside and the standby person outside is 
of utmost importance. If the worker should suddenly feel distressed and not 
be able to summon help, an injury could become a fatality. Frequently, the 
body positions that are assumed in a confined space make it difficult for the 
standby person to detect an unconscious worker [10]. When visual monitoring 
of the worker is not possible because of the design of the confined space or 
location of the entry hatch, a voice or alarm-activated explosion proof type 
of communication system will be necessary [15].
Suitable illumination of an approved type is required to provide
sufficient visibility for work in accordance with the recommendations made in 
the Illuminating Engineering Society Lighting Handbook.
(c) Entry and Exit
Entry and exit time is of major significance as a physical limitation and 
is directly related to the potential hazard of the confined space. The extent 
of precautions taken and the standby equipment needed to maintain a safe work 
area will be determined by the means of access and rescue. The following 
should be considered: type of confined space to be entered, access to the
entrance, number and size of openings, barriers within the space, the
occupancy load, and the time requirement for exiting in event of fire, or 
vapor incursion, and the time required to rescue injured workers [41].
(d) Physical
The hazards described in this section include non-chemical, physiologic 
stressors. These include thermal effects (heat and cold), noise, vibration, 
radiation, and fatigue while working in a confined space.
(1) Thermal Effects
Four factors influence the interchange of heat between man and his 
environment. They are: (1) air temperature, (2) air velocity, (3)
moisture contained in the air, and (4) radiant heat [42,43]. Because of the
nature and design of most confined spaces, moisture content and radiant heat 
are difficult to control. As the body temperature rises progressively,
workers will continue to function until the body temperature reaches 38.3 -
39.4 C. When this body temperature is exceeded, the workers are less 
efficient, and are prone to heat exhaustion, heat cramps, or heat stroke [44]. 
In a cold environment certain physiologic mechanisms come into play, which
29
tend to limit heat loss and Increase heat production. The most severe strain 
In cold conditions Is chilling of the extremities so that activity Is 
restricted [42]. Special precautions must be taken In cold environments to 
prevent frostbite, trench foot, and general hypothermia.
Protective insulated clothing for both hot and cold environments will add
additional bulk to the worker and must be considered in allowing for movement 
in the confined space and exit time. Therefore, air temperature of the 
environment becomes an important consideration when evaluating working
conditions in confined spaces.
(2) Noise
Noise problems are usually intensified in confined spaces because the 
interior tends to cause sound to reverberate and thus expose the worker to 
higher sound levels than those found in an open environment. This intensified 
noise increases the risk of hearing damage to workers which could result in 
temporary or permanent loss of hearing. Noise in a confined space which may 
not be intense enough to cause hearing damage may still disrupt verbal 
communication with the emergency standby person on the exterior of the
confined space. If the workers inside are not able to hear commands or danger 
signals due to excessive noise, the probability of severe accidents can 
increase [42].
(3) Vibration
Wholebody vibration may be regarded as a "generalized stressor" and 
may affect multiple body parts and organs depending upon the vibration 
characteristics. Segmental vibration, unlike wholebody vibration, appears to 
be more localized in creating injury to the fingers and hands of workers using 
tools, such as pneumatic hammers, rotary grinders or other hand tools which 
cause vibration [42].
(4) General/Physical
Some physical hazards cannot be eliminated because of the nature of the 
confined space or the work to be performed. These hazards include such items 
as scaffolding, surface residues, and structural hazards. The use of 
scaffolding in confined spaces has contributed to many accidents caused by 
workers or materials falling, improper use of guard rails, and lack of 
maintenance to insure worker safety. The choice of material used for 
scaffolding depends upon the type of work to be performed, the calculated 
weight to be supported, the surface on which the scaffolding is placed, and 
the substance previously stored in the confined space.
Surface residues in confined spaces can Increase the already hazardous 
conditions of electrical shock, reaction of incompatible materials, liberation 
of toxic substances, and bodily injury due to slips and falls. Without 
protective clothing, additional hazards to health may arise due to surface 
residues.
Structural hazards within a confined space such as baffles in horizontal 
tanks, trays in vertical towers, bends in tunnels, overhead structural 
members, or scaffolding installed for maintenance constitute physical hazards, 
which are exacerbated by the physical surroundings. In dealing with
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structural hazards, workers must review and enforce safety precautions to 
assure safety.
Rescue procedures nay require withdrawal of an injured or unconscious 
person. Careful planning must be given to the relationship between the 
internal structure, the exit opening, and the worker. If the worker is above
the opening, the system must include a rescue arrangement operated from
outside the confined space, if possible, by which the employee can be lowered 
and removed without injury
Statistical Data
Accidents in confined spaces, like all others, are required by Federal 
regulations to be reported only if medical attention or loss of time from
work, or death is involved. Some states and workers' compensation carriers 
have slightly more stringent requirements, but none require the reporting of 
incidents which can be considered near misses. The report by Safety Sciences 
prepared under contract for NIOSH [1] tended to show that fatalities occurred 
more frequently In confined spaces. For example, death by asphyxiation would 
be reported; however, if an employee experienced shortness of breath or
dizziness, but managed to escape the confined space, and was not treated by a 
physican, this would probably not be a reported case.
The criteria used in selecting cases was based on the definition published 
in the Federal Register 42:213, November 4, 1977 and specific circumstances
likely to be found on injury and fatality records.
Table III-l shows the number of "events", injuries, and fatalities from 
each data source. "Events" refers to the number of separate occasions in
which one or more confined space-related injuries or illnesses occurred [1].
Table III-2 shows the number of events, injuries and fatalities obtained 
for each of the 15 basic accident and illness types which are described in
Appendix 4 of this document. A total of 276 confined space related events
were identified, which resulted In a total of 234 injuries and 193 fatalities. 
The table shows that the most hazardous conditions in a confined space are a 
result of atmospheric related events [1].
Table III-3 shows the number of events by SIC code for each of the 15 
confined space-related accident and illness types [1].
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TABLE I I I - l
NUMBER OF CONFINED SPACE-RELATED CASES OBTAINED BY DATA SOURCE
Data Source








1. First Reports 
from Previous 
NIOSH Study 1974-75 20,000 67 66 1
2. OSHA 36's 1976-77 6 ,000 132 130 143
3. Equifax, Inc. 
"Occupational 
Death Reports" 
8/76-12/76 1,700 41 2 49
4. Shipbuilding and
Repair Cases 1976-77 750 36 36 0
Totals 28,450 276 234 193
Safety Sciences, San Diego, California - 1977 [1]
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TABLE I I I - 2
ACCIDENT AND ILLNESS TYPE 
CONFINED SPACE (CS)
Ref.
No. Accident and Illness Type Events Injuries Fatalities
1 Atmospheric Condition in CS 80 72 78
2 Explosion or Fire in CS 15 49 15
3 Explosion or Fire at Point-of-Entry 
to CS 23 20 32
4 Electrocution or Electrical Shock 11 2 9
5 Caught In/Crushing of CS 10 3 10
6 Trapped in Unstable Materials in CS 16 0 16
7 Struck by Falling Objects in CS 15 1 14
8 Falls (while in CS; not into CS) 27 26 1
9 Ingress/Egress of CS 33 30 3
10 Insufficient Maneuverability in CS 15 15 0
11 Eye Injury in CS 10 10 0
12 Contact with Temperature Extreme 
in CS 7 4 3
13 Noise in CS 1 1 0
14 Vibration in CS 1 1 0
15 Stress from Excess Exertion in CS 12 0 12
Totals 276 234 193
Safety Sciences, San Diego, California - 1977 [1]
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TABLE I I I - 3
CONFINED SPACE EVENTS BY SIC CODE AND ACCIDENT/ILLNESS TYPE
SIC Name of Industry *1 *2 *3 *4 *5 *6 *7 *8 *9 *10 *11 *12 *13 *14 *15
01 Agricultural Products - Crops 4 1 1 1
02 Agricultural Products - Livestock 1
07 Agricultural Services 1
09 Fishing, Hunting, and Trapping 1
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 6 1 1 1
15 Building Construction 2 2 2 1 3
16 Construction Other Than Building
Construction 6 3 1 2
17 Construction - Special Trade
Contractors 8 4 1 1 1 3
20 Food and Kindred Products 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 3 1
23 Apparel 3
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except
Furniture 1 3 1
25 Furniture and Fixtures 1
26 Paper and Allied Products 1 3 1 1
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 8 2 2 2 1 1
29 Petroleum Refining and Related
Industries 1
30 Rubber and Misc. Plastic Products 1 2
31 Leather and Leather Products 1 1
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete
Products 1 3 1 2
33 Primary Metal Industries 1 1 1 1 3 1 1
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Ex.
Machinery and Transportation Equip. 4 1 1 1 1
TABLE I I I - 3  (CONTINUED)
CONFINED SPACE EVENTS BY SIC CODE AND ACCIDENT/ILLNESS TYPE
SIC Name of Industry *1 *2 *3 *4 *5 *6 *7 *8 *9 *10 *11 *12 *13 *14 *15
35 Machinery, Except Electrical 2 1 1  2 2 1 1
36 Electrical and Electronic Equip. 1 1 1 1
37 Transportation Equip. 3 2 1  2 4 1  1 1 1
3731 Shipbuilding 4 1 1 8 13 7 1 1
38 Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling
Instruments; Photographic, Medical, 
and Optical Goods; Watches and
Clocks 1 1
42 Motor Freight Transportation and
Warehousing 3 1 3 1
44 Water Transportation 3 1
45 Transportation by Air 1 1
47 Transportation Services 1 1
48 Communication 3
49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 3 1 1
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 1 2 4 1
51 Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 1 2 1 1
54 Food Stores 1
55 Auto Dealers and Gas Stations 1
58 Eating and Drinking Places
59 Misc. Retail 1
65 Real Estate 1
TABLE I I I - 3  (CONTINUED)
CONFINED SPACE EVENTS BY SIC CODE AND ACCIDENT/ILLNESS TYPE
SIC Name of Industry *1 *2 *3 *4 *5 *6 *7 *8 *9 *10 *11 *12 *13 *14 *15
70 Hotels, Camps, and Other Lodging Places 1
73 Business Services 1
75 Automotive Repair 1 1
76 Misc. Repair Services 1 2
82 Educational Services 1
91 Executive, Legislative, and General 
Government 1





*1 - Atmospheric Condition
*2 - Explosion or Fire
*3 - Explosion or Fire at Point-of-Entry
*4 - Electrocution or Electrical Shock
*5 - Caught In/Crushing
*6 - Trapped in Unstable Materials
*7 - Struck by Falling Objects
*8 - Falls
*9 - Ingress/Egress
*10 - Insufficient Maneuverability
*11 - Eye Injury
*12 - Contact with Temperature Extreme
*13 - Noise
*14 - Vibration
*15 - Stress from Excess Exertion
Safety Sciences, San Diego, California - 1977 [1]
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDARD
Previous Standards
The basis for most of the previous standards were safety codes- designed 
for specific industrial activities, and dealt with areas such as open surface 
tanks, welding and cutting, and the pulp and paper, and shipping industries.
The most recent standard published on confined spaces is the 12-year 
effort compiled by the American National Standards Institute, Z117.1-1977. 
Despite the effort, the ANSI standard does not address the vitally important 
areas of training of personnel and specific recommendations for the safety 
equipment required in a confined space. All personal protective equipment is 
referenced to different ANSI Standards, which are broad based and do not 
address the specific problems of confined spaces.
The ANSI Standard also accepts the use of tagging as a reliable method of 
locking out a potentially hazardous situation. The tagging system as a 
substitute for locking out all lines or pipes, or de-energizing systems of a 
confined space does not provide sufficient protection to the worker against 
accidental activation.
The ANSI Standard does mention the use of life lines; however, the only 
recommendation is for their use in an oxygen deficient atmosphere.
The General Industry Safety and Health Standards of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) address safety in confined spaces in 
over 50 different sections of 29 CFR 1910. The defining parameters of a 
confined space as given in the OSHA regulations are: (1) limited means of
exit, (2) a space subject to accumulation of toxic or flammable contaminants 
or, (3) one where an oxygen deficient atmosphere may develop. It includes but 
is not limited to such spaces as storage tanks, process vessels, bins, boilers 
and open top spaces more than 4 feet in depth. This is essentially the same 
definition used to establish the scope of this recommended criteria. However 
the "Classification of open-surface tank operation" (1910.94(d) (2) (i-ii))
differs from the classification system proposed in this document. This 
proposed classification system is Intended to apply to all confined spaces and 
is based upon the evaluation of several additional parameters. Such a 
classification will allow the application of a wider range of safety measures 
and ease the enforcement of the OSHA regulation. The confined space 
classification system was designed to create a focal point by drawing together 
over 140 references in the OSHA standards. For example, the use of life lines 
in all confined spaces, has been addressed in this document and a solution to 
their excessive use has been proposed. The two documents agree on many areas 
of good work practices, such as the use of standby personnel, blanked-off 
lines, and main shutoff valves. Another area of agreement is the acceptance 
of 19.5% as the minimal oxygen level for safe work practice. There are some 
areas of the OSHA regulations that appear to accept tagging as a sufficient 
measure to ensure against opening of valves or energizing equipment during 
entry or while working in confined spaces. The proposed standard is more 
stringent in that only locking-out, blanking-off or disconnection are 
acceptable.
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Canadian [45] and Australian [46,47] regulations and standards on confined 
space entry were reviewed. The Canadian Standard uses a hazard evaluation 
report, which appears to be a condensed form of the recommended permit system. 
The Canadian Standard also relies on the qualified person to make decisions 
for entry and necessary precautions for working in and for making emergency 
escape. A minimum safe level of oxygen for entry is not stated, only what is 
considered an oxygen deficient atmosphere (less than 17% by volume). The 
Australian Standard, which comes under the Factories’ Regulations, states the 
confined space shall be emptied and flushed of hazardous substances and be 
ventilated with fresh air before entry. The Australian Standard is concerned 
primarily with entry and exit, not with isolation or safe oxygen level. The 
Australian Standard does; however, refer to a competent person similar to the 
qualified person for testing the atmosphere for flammable level. Other 
countries [14,48-50] published guidelines or standards for entering and 
working in confined spaces. Many of those reviewed follow recommendations 
similar to the Australian and Candadian standards. Therefore, it would be 
redundant to make a lengthy comparative list of standards. The state 
standards reviewed [8,12,51-54] and those from industry [40,55-68] were also 
closely evaluated. The number of references involved prohibits the citing of 
each one, although valuable concepts were obtained.
Basis for the Recommended Standard
Workers who enter and work in confined spaces are confronted with many 
potentially hazardous conditions. The hazards can range from an oxygen 
deficient atmosphere or liberation of a toxic agent, to mechanical equipment 
accidentally energized. The hazardous atmospheres that can be encountered in 
a confined space are; flammable, toxic, Irritant and/or corrosive, and 
asphyxiation. These atmospheric conditions are discussed in Chapter III, 
along with cited accident cases to emphasize the hazards involved with 
confined space entry.
The limited statistical data available on accidents and injuries directly 
related to confined spaces indicate a very high mortality level. This 
disproportionately high mortality level for the number of reported accidents 
and injuries could be the result of Inadequate reporting methods, as not 
reporting a near miss with death, or data collection systems failing to list a 
confined space as a causative or other factor in traumatic accidents. In the 
accident and injury cases tabulated for this document, atmospheric conditions 
in confined spaces were responsible for the most frequent accident type in 
terms of events and number of persons killed or injured [1].
The work practices section in Chapter I of the recommended standard was 
developed after extensive review of published literature, [2,11,15- 
17,31,33,36,55-92] the current Federal, State, and local applicable codes, 
[8,12,51-54,93-101], international codes or recommendations [3,45-50,102], and 
site visits to facilities where working in confined spaces is part of the 
industrial activity.
(a) Testing and Monitoring
Prior to entry into a confined space, workers should know the space's 
potential hazards. Deaths have occurred because a presumably safe space was 
not tested prior to initial entry [7,13]. The various tests to be performed
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prior to entry shall include tests for flammability, toxic agents, oxygen 
deficiency, and harmful physical agents. Specific instruments are required 
for testing the atmosphere for flammability, oxygen deficiency, carbon 
monoxide, and physical agents. For example, combustible gas Indicators are 
designed for the purpose of measuring the concentration of flammable gases, 
and will not measure or indicate the presence of carbon monoxide at toxic 
levels, conversely a carbon monoxide detector Is designed for the measurement 
of carbon monoxide only. It should be noted that combustible gas indicators 
respond differently to different flammable hydrocarbons and should be 
calibrated for the specific contaminant if known. The flammability 
measurement may be erroneous if the oxygen level is less or greater than 
normal atmospheric concentrations. Therefore, it is recommended that the 
oxygen level be determined prior to flammability testing to make any necessary 
corrections in the flammability measurement.
When the materials may form a combustible dust mixture, special 
precautions must be taken to prevent an explosive atmosphere from developing. 
There are numerous instruments available for measuring airborne dust 
concentrations; however, none appear to have automatic alarm systems and would 
require constant personal monitoring. The only practical approach to the 
control of combustible dusts is to eliminate the hazard by preventive 
measures, such as, (1) engineering controls, (2) good housekeeping, (3) 
elimination of ignition sources, (4) isolation of dust producing operations 
and, (5) training and education of the employees.
The oxygen deficiency measuring instrument is designed to measure the 
volume of oxygen present, usually scaled with a range of 0.0-25%. If the 
percentage of oxygen in a confined space atmosphere is less than 19.5% or 
greater than 25%, special precautions, as determined by the qualified person, 
shall be taken. In accordance with OSHA Safety and Health Standard 29 CFR 
Part 1910 and other references [12,33,51,76,87], a minimum oxygen level of 
19.5% has been adopted for worker safety. The upper oxygen limit has been set 
at 25% because an increase above this level will greatly increase the rate of 
combustion of flammable materials [11].
Continuous and/or frequent monitoring becomes necessary in cases where the 
work being performed within the confined space has the potential of generating 
toxic agents [4,5,14,54,58,64,74,81,83,84,86,87]. Data collected for NIOSH by 
Safety Sciences [1] shows that in 28 out of 80 accident events, the toxic gas 
or oxygen deficiency was not in the confined space at the time of entry, but 
was either generated by the work occurring in the space, or by gas being 
unexpectedly admitted into the confined space after the worker had entered. 
In these cases, only continuous and/or frequent monitoring would be a possible 
countermeasure.
(b) Medical
Medical requirements for workers who might enter a confined space should 
take into consideration the increased hazard potential of confined spaces. In 
this setting, the workers must rely more heavily upon their physical, mental, 
and sensory attributes, especially under emergency conditions. Workers should 
be evaluated by competent medical personnel to insure that they are physically 
and mentally able to wear respirators under simulated and actual working 
conditions. Because of the additional stress placed on the cardiopulmonary 
system, some pathologic conditions, such as cardiovascular diseases or those
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associated with hypoxemia, should preclude the use of respiratory protective 
devices [101].
In areas where the hazard potential is high, a person certified in CPR and 
first aid should be in attendance. Since irreversible brain damage can occur 
in approximately 4 minutes in an oxygen deficient atmosphere, it is essential 
that resuscitation attempts occur within that time [102].
(c) Safety Equipment and Clothing
Many cases of accidental dermal exposure, respiratory distress, and 
traumatic injury due to falling objects have occurred in confined spaces; 
therefore, a general safety standard should address the problem of whole body
protection [3]. Another area of concern is the use of life lines in all
confined spaces. Part of the recommended standard should be an evaluation of 
the confined space to define when life lines shall be used and when a safety 
belt with D rings for attaching life lines would be sufficient
[12,14,17,53,58,61,73,93,97,103,104].
(d) Training
Training of employees for entering and working in confined spaces is
essential because of the potential hazards and the use of life saving
equipment. To insure worker safety, the training program should be especially 
designed for the type of confined space involved and the problems associated
with entry and exit. If different types of confined spaces are involved, this
will require additional training. Areas that should be covered in an
effective training program are:
1. Emergency entry and exit procedures
2. Use of applicable respiratory equipment
3. First Aid and Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR)
4. Lockout procedures




Training of employees should be done by the qualified person or someone 
knowledgeable in all relevant aspects of confined space entry, hazard 
recognition, use of safety equipment, and rescue [3,33,53,58,63,68,84,90,97].
For training to be effective, classroom sessions, on-the-job training, or 
simulated conditions, appear to be the most satisfactory methods. Classroom 
sessions should include all applicable Federal, state, and local regulations 
that govern the specific industrial activity in which the employee will be 
working, as well as the hazards of a confined space (physical and chemical). 
The training guidelines in Chapter V can be used as a format for additional 
classroom activity. On-the-job training should be closely supervised until 
the employee has a complete understanding of all potential hazards. Testing 
of the employee should take place to evaluate the person's competency and 
determine if retraining is necessary.
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(1) Purging and ventilation - poor natural ventilation is one of the 
defining parameters of a confined space, therefore purging and mechanical 
ventilation must be closely evaluated when safe work practices are developed 
for entering and working in confined spaces. Purging is the initial step in 
adjusting the atmosphere in a confined space to acceptable standards (PGL's, 
LEL's, and LFL's). This is accomplished either by displacing the atmosphere 
in the confined space with fluid or vapor (inert gas, water, steam and/or 
cleaning solution), or by forced air ventilation. According to the literature
[11] 20 air changes should bring the atmosphere in the confined space into 
equilibrium with the external environment.
After purging, one establishes general and/or local exhaust ventilation to 
maintain a safe uncontaminated level. Guidelines for establishing ventilation 
rates are referenced in the ANSI Standard Z9.2-1972 [105] and NIOSH
Recommended Industrial Ventilation Guidelines [106] . In addition, other 
information applicable to the special problems of confined spaces must be 
considered such as the Occupational Safety and Health Standard 29 CFR 
1915.31(b) [31,45,69,107-109]. Entering into an inert atmosphere is one of
the most hazardous activities associated with working in a confined space. 
Work in an inert atmosphere is usually performed by employees of companies who 
specialize in this because of the high degree of training and expertise needed 
to perform inert entry operations safely. The scope of this document deals 
with the necessary precautions but does not cover the specialized training for 
entry into a confined space containing an inert atmosphere [11,106].
(2) Isolation/Lockout/Tagging - a review of the statistical data 
provided to NIOSH [1] demonstrated an obvious need for lockout procedures. 
The use of tags, while valuable for identification and/or information 
purposes, appears to have been inadequate in preventing accidents. A review 
of the literature has shown that proper isolation and lockout procedures are 
more effective than tagging [5,6,12,45,55,57,61,64,88,103].
(3) Cleaning - decontaminating a space by cleaning is necessary to
provide for worker safety. However, it must be recognized that the cleaning
process itself can generate additional hazards. Continuous and/or frequent 
monitoring is required during this process to determine that flammable 
mixtures and hazardous concentrations of contaminants are adequately diluted 
before safe entry can be made [3,5,15,20,48,49,59,61,79,80,91].
(4) Equipment and tools - the literature reviewed [15,58,63,64,109], 
has shown the potential for explosion is greatly increased when explosion 
proof equipped tools and equipment are not used or improperly maintained. 
Also the potential for electrocution is increased when low voltage or ground 
fault circuit interrupters are not used.
(5) Permit System - the inherent dangers associated with a confined
space clearly indicate the need for strict control measures of employees and
equipment. The literature has shown [50,52,55,56,63,69,77,86,88,90] that the 
use of a permit system is a very effective method of attaining control. The 
permit provides written authorization for entering and working in confined 
spaces, clearly states all known or potential hazards, and identifies the 
safety equipment required to insure the safety of the worker.
(e ) Work P r a c t i c e s
41
(6) Entry and Rescue - the potential hazards associated with a 
confined space must be evaluated prior to entry. These hazards would include 
the following: oxygen level, flammability characteristics, toxic agents, and
physical hazards ie, limited openings and communications. To simplify entry 
and rescue it would appear logical to set up a classification table for easy 
reference. The literature reviewed [5,12,51,63,69,76] has provided necessary 
information to set up an entry classification table and allow for flexibility 
in the selection of personal protective equipment.
It is essential that well planned rescue procedures and the proper use of 
personal protective equipment be followed. The literature and data reviewed 
have shown a very poor record in successful rescue efforts. Spontaneous 
reaction instead of well planned and executed rescue procedures has led to 
multiple fatalities in confined spaces. In 19 of the 25 cases in which rescue 
was attempted, the rescuers were injured or killed. These cases resulted in 
13 deaths and 30 injuries to rescuers, even though only 5 victims were 
successfully saved. One particular case resulted in injury to 15 rescuers; 
however, they were successful in saving 3 lives [1]. Therefore, the standby 
and/or rescue team shall be properly equipped and trained in all aspects of 
rescue.
(7) Recordkeeping - from a review of the limited data available (no 
SIC code for confined spaces) and the information collected from the plant 
site visits on accidents in confined spaces, it is apparent that recordkeeping 
systems must be changed to identify areas where accidents occur, so that 
underlying causes can be determined. The records to be kept by the employer 
should contain such information as employee name, age, training, job 
description, number of years on the job, accident location and severity, 
underlying causes, and action taken to insure future worker safety.
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V. TRAINING GUIDELINES
The very nature of the hazards encountered in a confined space is of 
paramount importance in structuring an effective training program which will 
provide for safe work practices and techniques. The training program should 
be based on the specific hazards to be encountered, approved by a trained 
safety person and given to all individuals who will perform the work or may be 
assigned as standby or rescue persons.
(a) Qualifications of Training Personnel
It is essential that the person in charge of training know the relevant 
aspects of safety as they relate to confined spaces. The instructor(s) must 
have a thorough working knowledge of the following:





(3) Work practices and techniques




(C) Other protection (shields, helmets, etc)
(6) Rescue procedures
(7) Knowledge of applicable Federal, state, and local regulations
(8) Evaluation and test methods
(b) Training methods
The method and approach of training will be determined by the previous 
experience and skills of the employee, with the exception of a newly hired 
person who should receive a complete and thorough safety orientation. Basic 
types of training prescribed are:
(1) Orientation of all new employees. This type of training would 
consist of classroom sessions along with a walk-through of the physical plant 
layout to give the trainee a basic understanding of the Industrial activity.
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(2) On-the-job training. This would be a second phase of training. 
After classroom sessions and after the trainee has gained a basic 
understanding of the operation and hazards involved, on-the-job instruction 
should include observation and closely supervised participation in actual work 
practices or simulated conditions.
(3) Retraining. This should be performed periodically and as 
frequently as needed. Many industrial activities are quite complex and 
operations are frequently updated to keep up with modern innovations. It is 
necessary, therefore, for a formal retraining program to be planned so that 
all personnel concerned may be kept abreast of changes. Retraining should 
also be considered necessary if a supervisor notices a weakness in employee 
performance.
(c) Training Evaluation
The effectiveness of the training program can be determined 
of the employee by the qualified person to see if safe work 
being followed, testing the employee for knowledge of the 
hazards, and a reduction in the accident rate due to safe work 
techniques which have been learned and are being practiced.
(d) Training Program
The work practices section presented in Chapter I was designed to set a
formalized standard that could, when complied with, eliminate or minimize
accidents and injuries occurring in confined spaces. The standard would not
be sufficient without a formal written training program and job planning to
convey safe work practices and their relationship to the entire operation.
The employer is responsible for ensuring that each employee is adequately 
trained and given refresher courses in assigned duties, and that the employee 
understands and applies safe work practices. The following are recommended 
areas that should be covered thoroughly in training:
(1) The types of confined spaces that are found in the industrial 
complex. This should cover physical location, size, and any pertinent 
information that would inform the worker of its function.
(2) Physical and chemical hazards involved. The physical hazards
would include structural members within a confined space, equipment that will 
be used, eg, scaffolding or ladders, size of openings, flooring, and other. 
Chemical hazards discussed will cover the product which has been stored, 
chemical cleaners used, and air contaminants which can be liberated due to the 
work practices.
(3) Atmospheric testing of the confined space. This phase of the 
instruction should emphasize the contaminants which should be tested for and 
the safe levels for entry.
(4) Cleaning and purging. Cleaning methods to be discussed should







(5) Ventilation of the space by mechanical methods to reduce or 
eliminate toxic airborne contaminants. This category should be covered 
sufficiently to alert the employee of potential hazards, and the need for 
warning devices to signal when there is a ventilation failure.
(6) Isolation and lockout of the confined space. The worker should 
be able to recognize a hazard by visual observation of the connecting lines to 
a confined space. The lockout of electrical circuits and mechanical 
disconnects to complete confined space isolation should be explained as should 
the employees' responsibilities in this area.
(7) Safety equipment and clothing. The worker should be aware of 
the proper use and care required for his personal protective equipment. This 
should include the type of protective shoes, gloves, face protection, 
protective clothing, head protection, and safety belts and harnesses that are 
to be worn as well as the rationale for their use. A major area in this 
section will be the use of respirators: the types required, their use, 
quantitative fit (test), respirator cleaning procedures, and proper storage. 
It should be emphasized that different type respirators are required for 
different atmospheres and the dangers involved when the wrong type is used 
[39]. The mandatory wearing of safety belts should be stressed. The use of 
safety belts and harnesses should be demonstrated so that each individual 
understands the importance of having the rescue system available, and 
operative, and is constantly aware of the necessity of keeping life lines 
clear to the point of exit.
(8) Buddy system and use of a standby person.
(9) Communication systems and emergency signals.
(10) Rescue procedures. All employees working in or around a 
confined space should be fully trained in emergency entry and exit procedures 
and be trained in first aid and CPR. This should include on-site entry and 
rescue drills.
(11) Permit system used by the employer. Information covered on the 
permit should include: purpose of the permit; location where permit will be
posted; responsible persons; emergency information, and hazards to be 
encountered.
(12) Documentation of Training. Satisfactory completion of this 
safety training, and refresher courses, should be entered into the employee's 
permanent record.
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V I. RESEARCH NEEDS
The primary research need in the area of confined spaces is the
development of a data system that would have the capability of recording
injury and mortality information specific to the causative factor eg, confined 
space and be readily accessible. It is now impossible to retrieve data 
directly related to confined space injuries and mortality, since data are
currently collected by general classifications, such as SIC codes. 
Feasibility studies are being done by NIOSH on a system that could correct 
this weakness in data recording and retrieval and provide a more accurate 
picture in areas such as confined space hazards. These data are essential to 
the proper evaluation of the causes of injuries and deaths. Specific data 
will provide a base for establishing training programs and standards aimed 
toward the more hazardous areas and permit the evaluation of current
standards. These data would also provide a background for analyzing unusual 
accidents to establish causal factors and prevent recurrence.
A final step that would be accomplished by an approved data base on
confined spaces would be to standardize the degree of hazards throughout
industry and provide justification for a uniform standard. This uniform 
standard would serve as the basis for a training program, which could be 
tailored to meet the needs of large as well as small industries.
The second area of research needed is development of more adequate methods 
for preventing and detecting gas leaks into confined spaces. Many accidents 
have occurred because the atmosphere in a confined space, which was presumed 
to be safe by the nature of the contents or obvious safe history of the 
confined space, had suddenly become lethal. Historical cases reported have
shown that faulty seals in storage or processing vessels may allow seepage 
from an external source, which could be naturally lethal or could form a 
lethal substance when combined with residual material in the tank.
A third area for research is the analytical devices used in confined
spaces, such as Intrinsically safe continuous monitors for gases as well as 
explosive dusts, personal dosimeters, and test meters designed to withstand 
rugged field use and maintain their integrity. It becomes difficult to 
calibrate a gas detection meter after continued field use and to be sure of 
its accuracy. The instrument, for field use, should be of the internal 
calibration type that will allow for more accurate testing.
A fourth area of research is the need to define and evaluate the stresses 
on employees who are required to work in confined spaces. This evaluation 
should include physical stressors (eg heat stress, cold stress) and sensory 
deprivation with respect to the work practice and length of work period.
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V I I I . APPENDIX I
CROSS REFERENCE -  NIOSH RECOMMENDED STANDARD FOR WORKING IN
CONFINED SPACES TO THE OSHA STANDARD
ftlOSH Recommended Standard OSHA Standard
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APPENDIX I  (CONTINUED)
CROSS REFERENCE -  NIOSH RECOMMENDED STANDARD FOR WORKING IN
CONFINED SPACES TO THE OSHA STANDARD
NIOSH Recommended S tan d a rd  OSHA S tan d a rd













































CROSS REFERENCE - NIOSH RECOMMENDED STANDARD FOR WORKING IN 
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IX. APPENDIX II 
RECOMMENDED RESPIRATORY SELECTION GUIDE
Hazard
Concentration*






5 x PEL 












full facepiece respirator with high efficiency 
filter(s) or self-contained breathing 
apparatus with full facepiece operated in 
the demand mode
supplied-air respirator with full facepi 
operated in any positive pressure mode
self-contained breathing apparatus with 
full facepiece operated in the pressure 
demand mode or a supplied-air respirator 
with full facepiece operated in any 
positive pressure mode with an auxiliary 
self-contained breathing apparatus
chemical cartridge respirator with full 
facepiece and cartridges approved for the 
specific contaminant(s) or a full face­
piece self-contained breathing apparatus 
operated in the demand mode
APPENDIX
Concentration* 
Hazard Less Than or Equal To













I I  (CONTINUED)
R e sp ira to r* *
Supplied-air respirator with full facepiece 
operated in any positive pressure mode
Self-contained breathing apparatus with full facepiece 
operated in the pressure-demand mode or 
combination supplied-air respirator with 
full facepiece operated in any positive 
pressure mode with an auxiliary self- 
contained breathing apparatus
a full facepiece combination respirator 
approved for dusts and mists and the 
specific contaminant(s) (gases or vapors)
powered air-purifying full facepiece 
combination respirator with high 
efficiency filter and chemical 
cartridge approved for the specific 
gas or vapor
supplied-air respirator with full 
facepiece operated in any positive 
pressure mode
self contained breathing apparatus with 
full facepiece operated in the 
pressure-demand mode or combination 
supplied-air respirator with full 
facepiece operated in any positive 
pressure mode with an auxilary self- 
contained breathing apparatus
APPENDIX I I  (CONTINUED)
Hazard
Concentration*
Less Than or Equal To Respirator**
unknown
contaminant
undetermined self-contained breathing apparatus with 
full facepiece operated in the positive 
pressure mode or a supplied-air 
respirator with full facepiece operated 
in any positive pressure mode with an 
auxilary self-contained breathing 
apparatus
inert and other 
atmospheres 
where the oxygen 
level is below 
17%
self-contained breathing apparatus with 
full facepiece operated in the pressure 
demand mode or a combination supplied 
air respirator with full facepiece 
operated in any positive pressure mode 




unknown self-contained breathing apparatus with full 
facepiece operated in the pressure demand 
mode or a combination supplied-air 
respirator with full facepiece operated 
in any positive pressure mode with an 
auxilary self-contained breathing 
apparatus
*If the concentration forms a flammable atmosphere only the self-contained breathing 
apparatus with full facepiece operated in the pressure-demand mode may be used.
**Any respirator recommended for a higher concentration may be used at a lower concentration.
***These respirators may not be used if the toxic material is carcinogenic.
****If the concentration forms an atmosphere which is immediately dangerous to life 
then only the self-contained breathing apparatus operated in the pressure mode or the 
combination supplied-air respirator with full facepiece operated in any positive mode 
with an auxilary self-contained breathing apparatus may be used.




Location of Work: ________________________________________________
Description of Work (Trades): ___________________________________
Employees Assigned: ______________________________________________
Entry Date:   Entry Time: ___________ _

































Head, Hand, and Foot Protection 
Shields







Training Sign Off (Supervisor or Qualified Person) 
Remarks : ______________________________




















C la s s i f i c a t i o n :  __________________________ __
Location - Reading
________  (19.5%)____________
________  (Less than 10% LFL)
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XI. APPENDIX IV
CHARACTERISTICS OF CASES INCLUDED AS "CONFINED SPACE RELATED"
Ref. Accident Type 




Toxic levels in CS of substances:
- contained in CS
- from decomposition of substances 
in CS
- from mixture of substances in CS
- substances being used in CS, 
eg, cleaning solvents
- catalytic heaters
- vapors left from previously 
emptied CS
- welding fumes
Falls or other types which are 
not the result of hazardous atmos­
pheric conditions, eg, due to 
surface condition of CS, are covered 
under other Accident Types such as 
Ref. No. 8.
Oxygen deficiency, due to:
- fermentation
- rust
- use of other gases, eg, nitrogen 
to clear combustible gases
- welding in CS
Includes cases in which the 
employee was at the point of entry 
to the CS (eg, leaning into CS 
to measure) and was overcome.
Includes allergic reactions to 
substances Inhaled.
(*Note: all cases involving mining, tunneling are excluded.)
APPENDIX IV (CONTINUED)
CHARACTERISTICS OF CASES INCLUDED AS "CONFINED SPACE RELATED"
Ref. Accident Type
No. or Illness Characteristics of Included Cases Related, but Excluded, Cases
Includes falls and other accident 
types even if the employee was 
outside the CS before he fell, if, 
and only if, they were the result 
of being overcome by atmospheric 
substances.
Examples: employee was sitting on
top of silo and was overcome by 
gas from fermenting corn and fell 
into silo; employee fell from 
ladder, when he was overcome by 
gas in CS; employee drowned when 
he was overcome by gas and fell 
into 12" deep water in CS.
Explosion or 
Fire in CS
Only includes cases in which one or 
more victims were in the CS at the 
time.
May be able to identify a spark - 
generating activity that occurred 
in CS, eg,





Cases in which a CS exploded but no 
victim was inside.
Cases in which the CS exploded for 
"no apparent reason" or a reason 
not connected with the activities 
of those in the CS.
Usually the result of a 
combination of combustible gases 
in CS and spark from activity of 
employee in CS.
APPENDIX IV (CONTINUED)
CHARACTERISTICS OF CASES INCLUDED AS "CONFINED SPACE RELATED"
Ref. Accident Type








Cases in which an employee was 
welding, using a power tool, or 
some other spark generating 
activity at the entry point 
to the CS.
Driving an automobile near to 
a CS containing combustible 
materials.
Must appear to be result, at 
least in part, of the CS.
Frequently the result of the 
conductive walls of the CS.
Cases in which a CS exploded for "no 
apparent reason" or for a reason 
unconnected with the activity of 
the employee near the CS, eg,
"just walking by and it blew up."
Cases in which the employee was 
welding (or performing some other 
spark-generating activity) on a 
CS which is too small for, and 
would almost certainly never be 
used to contain an employee, 
eg, 55 gal oil drums. Welding 
drums containing flammable liquids 
or left over vapors is an extremely 
common cause of fatalities, and has 
causal factors similar to CS- 
related cases were not typical 
of the problem NIOSH is addressing.
Cases in which an electrically "hot" 
source just happened to be in a 
CS eg, "I picked up a cable 
with a frayed wire".
APPENDIX IV (CONTINUED)
CHARACTERISTICS OF CASES INCLUDED AS "CONFINED SPACE RELATED"
Ref. Accident Type




Cases in which an employee 
entered a machine and failed to 
"lock-out". The machine is 
activated and the employee is 
crushed inside the machine.
The victim must be inside a 
machine which it was intended 
that he should enter and he 
must have entered deliberately.
Elevator shafts, or cases in 
which the employee was on top 
of an elevator and crushed in 
the "CS" when it was elevated.
Cases in which the machine is too 
small for the employee to ever 
place his entire body inside 
eg, caught in conveyor gear's.
Cases in which the employee was 
under (not in) a machine or 
machine part. In particular, 
being trapped under a vehicle 
eg, when the jack slips or 
under a falling bed of a dump 
truck are not included.
Cases in which the employee is 
drawn into the machine.
Examples of such machines 
include rock crushers.






"Quicksand" effect of standing 
in silos containing fine grain or 
beans.
Employee must have been in the CS 
before the surface gave way 
eg, unjamming blockage or 
intentionally stepped into CS 
with the unstable surface 
material.
Falls into machines.
Falls into CS containing such 
the result of atmospheric 
conditions (Ref. No. 1).
APPENDIX IV (CONTINUED)
CHARACTERISTICS OF CASES INCLUDED AS "CONFINED SPACE RELATED"
Ref. Accident Type




Employee is struck by objects 
falling from walls of CS or through 
point of entry of CS.
Related in that employee is 
unable to maneuver to safety 
in a CS.
(Eye injuries are covered in 
Ref. No. 11.)
Does not Include cave-ins of 
trenches as these have not been 
considered to be CS's.
Falls
(while in CS)
Includes being suffocated when 
a CS is accidentally filled 
while the employee is in it.
Only to employees in CS 
due to surface condition eg, 
wet, oil; configuration eg, 
a rolling barrel; or other 
characteristics of the CS.
Falls through holes in or 
breaking part of CS, eg, 
employee goes through weak part 
of ventilation duct as he crawls 
through it.
Falls over objects or tools, eg, 
holes, on floor of CS when it is 
not possible to locate elsewhere.
Falls into a CS eg, uncovered man­
hole. Atmospheric condition of CS
Falls in CS where no characteristic 
of the CS was involved.
(Falls while leaving or entering 
the CS are covered in Ref. No. 9.)
Falls due to poor lighting in CS,
Falls due to uneven surface of CS.
APPENDIX IV (CONTINUED)




or Illness Characteristics of Included Cases Related, but Excluded, Cases
9 Ingress/Egress Strains, bodily reactions, 
abrasions, or falls as the result 
of entering or leaving a cramped, 
sharp-edged, high-level, or 
otherwise hazardous point-of- 
entry to a CS.
(Must be a bonafide CS ,  eg, 
ingress/egress of vehicle cabs, 
though subject to similar hazards, 
are not included because they 




Strains, bodily reactions, 
abrasions, contact with caustic 
substances, etc. when they are in 
part the result of attempting to 
maneuver in a CS.
Cases of insufficient space when 
the employee is working under 
a machine (even though cramped),  







Includes striking self or being 
struck by fellow employee as the 
result of a CS.
<
g2







1 1 Eye Injury 
in CS
From dust falling from walls of 
CS ,  generated by activity in CS ,  





Welding arc when unable to use 






1 2 Contact with 
Temperature





Heat exhaustion or frost bite 
from temperature of CS.
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